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Article 1

ARTICLES

The New Moral Turpitude Test
FAILING CHEVRON STEP ZERO
Mary Holper†
INTRODUCTION
In the waning days of the Bush administration,
Attorney General Michael Mukasey decided In re SilvaTrevino,1 in which he reversed over a century of immigration
law precedent by creating a new moral turpitude test.2
Attorney General Mukasey altered the “categorical approach,”
which immigration judges use to decide whether a noncitizen is
removable for a criminal conviction. Under the traditional
categorical approach, immigration judges look only at the
elements of the statute of conviction and, if necessary, the
record of conviction to determine whether the offense involved
moral turpitude. The new moral turpitude test is a total
overhaul of the categorical approach; it allows judges to look
behind the record of conviction and engage in a factual inquiry,
thus potentially subjecting many more noncitizens to removal
for a crime involving moral turpitude.
The Attorney General’s broad, sweeping change to
immigration law was not made through the notice-and†
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1
24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
2
Id. at 688.
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comment rulemaking process. Indeed, he did not even notify
the parties to the adjudication that he was contemplating a
reversal of years of precedent. Thus, parties had no opportunity
to brief the issue; nor did outside groups have an opportunity to
comment as amici until after the Attorney General already had
published the decision. Rather, the decision was made at the
eleventh hour of the Bush administration, after election results
had determined that a Democratic administration would gain
control of the Department of Justice (DOJ) two months later.
In this article, I argue that courts should refuse
deference to Silva-Trevino notwithstanding the principles of
deference embodied in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC.3 Chevron introduced a now
well-known two-step analysis to determine whether an
agency’s decision deserves deference: first, courts determine
whether Congress’s intent was clear in its statutory language;
second, if Congress was not clear, courts defer to the agency’s
interpretation, so long as it is reasonable.4 The Court later
introduced what scholars call “Chevron step zero—the initial
inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies at all.”5 In
an important step zero decision, the Court decided United
States v. Mead Corp.,6 holding that courts should not defer to
agency interpretations of law issued through informal
procedures because such interpretations do not have the force
of law.7 I argue that the Attorney General did not decide SilvaTrevino using law-like procedures: the decision-making process
demonstrated neither transparency nor careful consideration.
Therefore, under Mead, Silva-Trevino does not have the force
of law and should not be given Chevron deference.
In Part I, I describe the removal process for noncitizens
and the categorical approach, the method by which immigration
judges determine removability for a criminal conviction. I also
describe the Silva-Trevino decision, in which the Attorney
General rejected the traditional categorical approach for
resolving whether an offense is a “crime involving moral

3

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Id. at 842-43.
5
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 191 (2006); Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001).
6
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
7
Id. at 226-27.
4
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turpitude.”8 In addition, I discuss the secretive process by which
the Attorney General rendered the decision in Silva-Trevino.
In Part II, I discuss different types of deference courts
give to agency decisions, including the light amount of
deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.9 and the heavy
deference under Chevron. I focus on the Court’s decision in
Mead, in which the Court refused Chevron deference, but
applied Skidmore deference, to an agency decision that did not
have the force of law.
In Part III, I argue that the Attorney General’s decision
in Silva-Trevino should not survive Chevron step zero because
the decision-making process did not allow public input before
significantly changing immigration law. As the process by
which the Attorney General made his decision did not ensure
transparency or careful consideration, the Chevron analysis
should not apply, pursuant to the Court’s decision in Mead. I
also discuss arguments that Chevron deference should apply
due to the Silva-Trevino decision’s binding effect and
authoritative nature.
In Part IV, I propose solutions for both courts and the
DOJ to grapple with the Silva-Trevino decision. As discussed in
Part III, courts can refuse deference at Chevron step zero.
Refusing Chevron deference means that courts will apply
Skidmore deference, a multifactor approach giving deference to
the agency’s interpretation based on the thoroughness,
consistency, and validity of its position. I argue that, under
Skidmore deference, the Attorney General’s decision in SilvaTrevino is likely to fail. Another solution is directed at the
agency: the current agency head, Attorney General Eric H.
Holder, can reconsider Silva-Trevino by vacating the decision
and commencing rulemaking. He also can sua sponte
reconsider the decision, but ask for briefing from affected
parties before his final decision. Either rulemaking or a more
participatory adjudication would cure the process problems of
the original decision, allowing for public input that ensures
transparency and careful consideration by the agency. This
article concludes that, whether through judicial review or
agency action, the lack of procedural fairness and transparency
leading to the new moral turpitude test must be corrected
through re-examination of the issue in a fashion that allows for
8
9

In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688-89 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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I.

THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST IN CONTEXT

A.

From Arrest to Removal

the

full

The new moral turpitude test impacts all citizens facing
charges of violating the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)10 by having been convicted of a “crime involving moral
turpitude” (CIMT).11 Consider the hypothetical situation of
Juan, a noncitizen who has been convicted of larceny under
state law.12 Years after Juan completed his sentence, he is
stopped for a routine traffic stop. The police officer runs a
background check on Juan and contacts the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agency (ICE), a subagency of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS),13 which takes Juan
into custody.14 A trial attorney who works for DHS files a
charging document called a “Notice to Appear” in immigration
court, thus commencing removal proceedings.15 The Notice to
10

8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b) (2008).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (rendering inadmissible noncitizen who
has been convicted of or admitted to the essential elements of a CIMT); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2008) (proscribing removal for conviction for one CIMT committed
within five years of admission if the crime is punishable by at least a one-year
sentence); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (removal for two CIMT convictions, not arising
out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct, committed at any time after admission).
12
Juan’s story is not a true story; however, it is based on sets of facts from
different clients the author has represented.
13
The Department of Homeland Security, which Congress created in 2002 by
passing the Homeland Security Act, absorbed most of the immigration functions of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service, including the enforcement of
immigration laws. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135, 2192 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 251 (2003)). ICE became responsible for
detention, removal, and investigations. See ICE Overview, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/
about/overview (follow “Strategic Plan” link) (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
14
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 287.5(c) (2005). This type of
cooperation between states and ICE is facilitated by 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), under which
ICE may enter into written agreements with states or localities in which state or local
officers, with proper training, act as ICE agents. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)-(2). Currently,
ICE has these types of agreements with sixty-nine law enforcement agencies in twentyfour states. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/
287g.htm (last visited June 1, 2011).
15
See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.13, 1003.14(a), 1003.15(c) (2008). Prior to 1996,
noncitizens who had been admitted to the United States were in “deportation”
proceedings, whereas those who were stopped attempting to enter the United States
were in “exclusion” proceedings. The 1996 reforms to the Immigration and Nationality
Act discontinued the use of the term “deportation” and replaced it with “removal.”
Immigration judges still preside over deportation or exclusion proceedings, however, if
11
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Appear charges Juan with a violation of INA16 for having been
convicted of a CIMT (his larceny conviction).17
The immigration judge, an employee of the Executive
Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) within the DOJ, decides
Juan’s case.18 She first decides whether he is removable for such
offense, i.e., whether he has been “convicted,”19 and, if so,
whether his offense is a CIMT.20 If the judge finds Juan
removable, he may apply for any relief from removal for which
he is eligible.21 At a later hearing, the judge decides whether
Juan merits that relief; she makes this decision after a trial-like
hearing at which both Juan and the DHS trial attorney may
present evidence.22 At the conclusion of this hearing, the judge
decides whether Juan will be deported or remain in the United
States.23 The two parts of a removal proceeding can be likened to
a criminal trial: first the judge determines whether Juan is
“guilty” (deportable); if so, she decides his “sentence” (if she
grants him relief from removal, he stays in the United States).24
Either Juan or the DHS trial attorney may appeal the
immigration judge’s decisions to the Board of Immigration

proceedings commenced prior to April 1, 1997. 5 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN
& STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.01 (rev. ed. 2010).
16
8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b).
17
See supra note 11.
18
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0 (2007); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12 (2008).
19
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2010) (defining “conviction” for immigration
purposes).
20
The process by which the judge determines whether a state offense is a
CIMT is discussed more infra Part I.B.
21
One common example of relief from removal is cancellation of removal,
which is a discretionary waiver for long-term permanent residents who have been
convicted of a removable offense, where Juan must show that he has been a lawful
permanent resident for at least five years, has resided continuously in the United
States for at least seven years, and has not been convicted of an “aggravated felony.” 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2008). Other forms of relief include: (1) adjustment of status (i.e.
application for a greencard), see, e.g., id. § 1255; (2) asylum, see id. § 1158(a) (2009); (3)
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (which requires the applicant to
show a 51% likelihood of persecution if removed), see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 431 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429 (1984); and (4) withholding or deferral
of removal under the Convention Against Torture (which requires the applicant to
show a 51% likelihood that his government will torture him if he is removed), see 8
C.F.R. §§ 208.16-208.18 (2009).
22
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
23
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.37 (2008).
24
One form of relief, voluntary departure, would not allow Juan to stay in
the United States. Voluntary departure allows Juan to leave voluntarily, without the
consequences of a removal order. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (2006); see also id.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii) (2010) (stating that a noncitizen who has an order of removal is
inadmissible for ten years after the date of removal).
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Appeals (BIA), a fourteen-member body25 that sits within EOIR
and decides appeals of decisions of immigration judges nationwide.26 At any point of this process, the Attorney General may
vacate an immigration judge’s or BIA panel’s decision and
certify an issue to him- or herself.27 Once Juan has a final order
of removal, issued either by the BIA or the Attorney General,
he may appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the federal
circuit court in which the immigration judge completed
proceedings.28 On appeal, the attorney arguing against Juan is
from the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) of the DOJ
Civil Division.29 The federal circuit courts may hear issues of
law or constitutional issues in immigration cases, as opposed to
pure questions of discretion.30 In Juan’s case, this means that a
circuit court will more likely hear whether his offense is a
CIMT (a question of law), rather than whether, in the exercise
of discretion, he merits relief from removal.31

25

The BIA is authorized to have up to fifteen members, although there are
currently fourteen permanent and three temporary Board members. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1)
(2009); EOIR Fact Sheet: Board of Immigration Appeals Biographical Information, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST. (April. 2011), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/fs/biabios.htm.
26
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). The American Bar Association (ABA) recently
addressed the problems inherent in the current system, in which immigration judges and
the BIA lack independence because they are located within an executive branch agency
responsible for law enforcement; other problems with the system include inefficiency and
perceptions that the system is both unfair and that judges lack professionalism. See AM.
BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: PROPOSALS TO
PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 43-48 (2010), available at http://new.abanet.org/
Immigration/PublicDocuments/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf.
The ABA proposed a restructuring of the current system, either by converting the judges
and BIA into Article I judges or, in the alternative, creating an independent agency to
adjudicate immigration cases. See id. at 48.
27
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i).
28
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2) (2005).
29
While DOJ Civil Division attorneys usually are generalists, OIL “focuses
exclusively on immigration cases.” Margaret Taylor, Behind the Scenes of St. Cyr and
Zadvydas: Making Policy in the Midst of Litigation, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 271, 293
n.122 (2002); see also 28 C.F.R. § 0.45(k) (2008); Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The
Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1345, 1345-49 (2000) (discussing that some agencies can litigate on their own behalf
while others must be represented by the DOJ).
30
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D). Scholars have discussed the difficulty of
separating issues of law from issues of discretion. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom,
Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration
Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703 (1997).
31
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), (D).
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The Categorical Approach

Juan was not convicted under a state statute named “the
offense of moral turpitude.” How does the immigration judge
determine whether the crime of his conviction was a CIMT? The
INA does not define CIMT in the same way that it defines, for
example, what is an aggravated felony.32 Judges must rely on
precedent decisions by the BIA and federal courts defining the
term; for example, convictions involving fraud,33 theft,34 and
serious bodily injury35 all have been held to be CIMTs.
Dating back to when “moral turpitude” first appeared in
the immigration laws,36 courts have preferred an elements-based
analysis to determine whether an offense involves moral
turpitude.37 This analysis requires a judge to determine the
elements of the criminal offense, i.e., the minimum acts that the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt in order for the
jury to convict.38 The judge then considers whether this
“minimum conduct” involves moral turpitude.39 If the minimum
conduct does not involve moral turpitude, an adjudicator cannot
32

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (2010) (defining twenty-one different
categories of offenses that are aggravated felonies); see also Abdelqadar v. Gonzales,
413 F.3d 668, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A]ggravated felony’ is a defined term, while
‘crime involving moral turpitude’ is not.”). The term CIMT has been challenged as void
for vagueness, but the term withstood that challenge in Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S.
223, 232 (1951).
33
See Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227; In re Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 225, 228 (B.I.A. 1980).
34
A theft offense that punishes a defendant for permanently, as opposed to
temporarily, depriving the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership is a crime
involving moral turpitude. See In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144-45 (B.I.A. 1941).
35
See In re Sejas, 24 I. & N. Dec. 236, 236-37 (B.I.A. 2007); In re Fualaau, 21
I. & N. Dec. 475, 477-78 (B.I.A. 1996).
36
The term “moral turpitude” first appeared in federal immigration law in
1891; the Act of March 3, 1891, excluded from the United States the following persons:
All idiots, insane persons, paupers or persons likely to become a public
charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a dangerous or contagious
disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous crime
or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person
whose ticket or passage is paid for with the money of another or who is
assisted by others to come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown
on special inquiry that such person does not belong to one of the foregoing
excluded classes . . . .
Act of March 3, 1891, Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (1891).
37
See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914). For
a longer discussion of this elements-based analysis, see Rebecca Sharpless, Toward a
True Elements Test: Taylor and the Categorical Analysis of Crimes in Immigration
Law, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 979-80 (2008).
38
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
39
See In re Short, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949, 950 (B.I.A. 1999).
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consider the underlying facts that led to the conviction.40 This
approach, commonly called the “categorical approach,” later
became the method by which immigration judges determined
removability for firearms offenses, aggravated felony
convictions, and all other criminal grounds of removability.41
The elements of a particular offense do not always line
up neatly with the elements of the ground of removability.42
State statutes can be multisectional or disjunctive; often there
are elements of the offense that fit within the removability
ground and elements that do not. When a noncitizen has been
convicted under such a statute, which is called a “divisible”
statute, immigration judges consult the record of conviction to
determine the nature of the conviction.43 The record of
conviction is limited to the documents upon which the jury
relied to convict: the charging document and jury instructions.44
In the case of a plea, the plea agreement is also part of the
record of conviction.45 Documents such as the police report do
not typically form the basis of the facts presented to the jury,
but are merely one version of the facts leading to the
conviction.46 Thus, the facts leading up to a conviction—what
happened on the street—do not matter to an immigration
judge.47 Using the categorical approach, the judge may only
consider the elements of the criminal statute and, if necessary,
the documents contained in the record of conviction.48
40

See Mylius, 210 F. at 863.
See, e.g., In re Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008)
(using categorical approach to determine removability for a crime of child abuse
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)); In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 334
(B.I.A. 1996) (using categorical approach to determine removability for a firearms
offense pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i)); In re Alcantar, 20 I. & N. Dec.
801, 810-13 (B.I.A. 1994) (using categorical approach to determine removability for an
aggravated felony pursuant to former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
42
See Dulal-Whiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.
2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009).
43
See Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 334.
44
See In re Milian-Dubon, 25 I. & N. Dec. 197, 199 (B.I.A. 2010).
45
See id. (citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16, 26 (2005)).
46
See In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (B.I.A. 1996). This
consideration of the record of conviction is commonly called the “modified categorical
approach.” See, e.g., Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 122. For the purposes of this article, I
will refer to both the categorical and the modified categorical approach collectively as
the “categorical approach.”
47
See In re Torres-Varela, 23 I. & N. Dec. 78, 84 (B.I.A. 2001) (“The crime
must be one that necessarily involves moral turpitude without consideration of the
circumstances under which the crime was, in fact, committed.”).
48
The development of the categorical approach in immigration law has been
influenced by the categorical approach used in the criminal sentencing context. See
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990) (determining whether a state
41
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Applying the categorical approach, the judge in Juan’s
case will look at the statute of conviction, larceny. The state in
which Juan was convicted has a broad larceny statute, which
defines some offenses that involve moral turpitude (permanent
takings) and some that do not (temporary takings).49 The judge
then looks at the record of conviction, which includes the
charging document and Juan’s plea agreement.50 If these
documents do not indicate whether he was convicted for a
permanent or temporary taking, Juan is not removable, as the
burden is on DHS to prove removability.51
C.

In re Silva-Trevino: The New Moral Turpitude Test

In Silva-Trevino, a 2008 decision, Attorney General
Mukasey overhauled the categorical approach by creating a new
burglary conviction was a predicate burglary offense under the Armed Career Criminal
Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), in order to enhance the defendant’s sentence for being
a “career” criminal; holding that if the statute of prior conviction was broader than the
generic burglary statute, the sentencing court only could look to the documents upon
which the jury relied to convict, such as the charging paper and jury instructions); see
also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 19 (applying Taylor’s reasoning to prior convictions that were
based on plea agreements). Many of the reasons for the use of the categorical approach
in immigration cases track the reasons for its use in the criminal sentencing context.
Like the sentencing statute, most of the criminal removal grounds are premised on a
“conviction.” See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600; Dulal-Whiteway, 501 F.3d at 125 (reasoning
that uses of the word “conviction” in the sentencing and removal contexts are
analogous and thus the categorical approach as used in Taylor is the appropriate
approach for criminal removal cases); In re Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513
(B.I.A. 2008) (“[W]here a ground of deportability is premised on the existence of a
‘conviction’ . . . the focus of the immigration authorities must be on the crime of which the
alien was convicted, to the exclusion of any other criminal or morally reprehensible acts
he may have committed.”). In addition, immigration judges, like sentencing judges, do not
have time to retry a prior conviction. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 (“[T]he practical
difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are daunting.”); PichardoSufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 335; see also infra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
However, unlike the criminal sentencing context, the use of the categorical approach in
removal proceedings is not mandated by the Sixth Amendment, as there is no right to a
jury trial in removal proceedings. See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 24 (citing Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)) (reasoning that a sentencing judge’s factual inquiry into
the underlying offense would raise Sixth Amendment concerns, since any fact other than
a prior conviction that raises the limit of a possible sentence must be found by a jury, not
a judge, in the absence of a defendant’s waiver of such rights); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d
737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008). Also, the burdens of proof do not line up in criminal and removal
cases; in a criminal case, the prosecution must prove every element “beyond reasonable
doubt,” whereas in a removal case, the government must prove every element of a
removal ground by “clear and convincing evidence.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2006);
Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2303 (2009).
49
See In re D-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 143, 144-45 (B.I.A. 1941) (holding that theft
with intent to steal is a CIMT, whereas theft with intent to deprive the owner of his
rights for a temporary period is not a CIMT).
50
See In re Milian-Dubon, 25 I. & N. Dec. 197, 199 (B.I.A. 2010) (citations omitted).
51
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).
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three-part test to determine whether an offense is a CIMT.52 In
the first step, an immigration judge “must determine whether
there is a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,’”
that the statute under which the noncitizen was convicted
reaches “conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.”53 In the
second step, if the statute is divisible, judges must use the
traditional categorical approach, looking to the record of
conviction to determine whether the offense involved moral
turpitude.54 The third step is where the Attorney General
significantly broke with the traditional categorical approach:
“When the record of conviction is inconclusive, judges may, to
the extent they deem necessary and appropriate, consider
evidence beyond the formal record of conviction.”55
52

See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689-704 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
Id. at 689-90 (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193
(2007)). The Attorney General stated, “Imagination is not . . . the appropriate standard
under the framework set forth in this opinion. Instead, the question is whether there is
a ‘realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,’ that the . . . statute would be
applied to reach conduct that does not involve moral turpitude.” Id. at 708 (quoting
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193). The “realistic probability” test requires respondents
to cite actual (not hypothetical) cases in which the relevant criminal statute is applied
to conduct that does not involve moral turpitude. See In re Loussaint, 24 I. & N. Dec.
754, 757 (B.I.A. 2009) (citing Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 698). This new approach
shifts the burden to respondents to produce a case in which nonturpitudinous conduct
was actually punished by the statute, a task that can be extremely difficult since many
criminal statutes are enforced through plea agreements that never produce a
published, written decision. See, e.g., Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1138 n.10 (9th
Cir. 2010) (holding that under the realistic probability test, a respondent can use
unpublished cases interpreting the statute of conviction to prove that the statute
punishes nonturpitudinous conduct); Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462,
482 (3d Cir. 2009) (reasoning that the realistic probability test appears to shift the
burden from the government, who must prove removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(3), to the respondent, who must prove that nonturpitudinous conduct is
actually punished under the statute of conviction); Norton Tooby & Dan Kesselbrenner,
Living With Silva-Trevino 8-11, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT (2009), available at
http://nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/cd_pa_Living%20With%20SilvaTrevino%20-%202009.pdf (arguing that the realistic probability test impermissibly
places the burden of proof on the respondent to find cases interpreting the statute of
conviction to prove that the statute punishes nonturpitudinous conduct and discussing
cases in which circuit courts have interpreted the realistic probability test).
54
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 690.
55
Id. Step three of the new CIMT analysis was foreshadowed by two 2007
BIA decisions in which the BIA started to reject the categorical approach, allowing
judges to peer behind the record of conviction and engage in a factual, not categorical,
inquiry. See In re Gertsenshteyn, 24 I. & N. Dec. 111, 115-16 (B.I.A. 2007) (creating a
bifurcated approach for analyzing prostitution aggravated felony offenses under 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(ii), which requires judges to use the categorical approach to
determine whether the offense involves prostitution, but permits judges to use a
factual inquiry to determine whether the offense was committed for “commercial
advantage”); see also In re Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 322 (B.I.A. 2007) (applying
the bifurcated approach to another aggravated felony ground, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), and holding that judges should use the categorical approach to
53
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The Attorney General wrote a detailed opinion
describing the reasons for overhauling the categorical approach
in the CIMT context.56 He first pointed to some ambiguity in the
INA,57 which would allow the agency to command deference in
this new analysis.58 The Attorney General next discussed a
“patchwork” of circuit court decisions on the use of the
categorical approach; in the name of the uniform application of
immigration law, he wished to create one approach to the
CIMT analysis with his decision in Silva-Trevino.59 The
Attorney General also concluded that the categorical approach
can be underinclusive, since some noncitizens who committed
offenses that actually involved moral turpitude would be free
from removal if they were convicted under a broad statute, or
overinclusive, since some courts consider the “general nature”
of the crime and its classification in “common usage.”60
determine whether the offense involves fraud, but may use a factual inquiry to
determine whether the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000). In Nijhawan v. Holder, the
Supreme Court applied the bifurcated approach for analyzing fraud aggravated felony
offenses under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i); the Court held that judges would use the
categorical approach to determine whether the offense involves fraud, but may use a
factual inquiry to determine the loss to the victim. See 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2301-02 (2009).
56
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-704.
57
See id. at 693. For example, two deportation statutes use the phrase
“convicted of” a CIMT, which would indicate Congressional preference for the
categorical approach; however, one inadmissibility statute uses the phrase
“committing” a CIMT. See id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i),
(ii)); see also In re Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008) (reasoning
that where a ground of removability is based on the existence of a conviction for a
particular offense, “the focus of the immigration authorities must be on the crime of
which the alien was convicted, to the exclusion of any other criminal or morally
reprehensible acts he may have committed”). He also highlighted the use of the word
“involving” in the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” to indicate a Congressional
preference for a factual inquiry. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 693 (“[Congress]
said that deportation was the consequence when the crime involved moral turpitude,
and I can only assume that it meant when moral turpitude was in fact involved.”
(quoting Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1028 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added))).
58
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S.
967, 981-82 (2005) (giving Chevron deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation
even though it conflicts with prior agency and circuit court interpretations).
59
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 694; infra note 317.
60
The Attorney General, citing the dissenting opinion in Marciano,
highlighted the potential for the categorical approach to yield over- or underinclusive
determinations:
I cannot believe that Congress intended for [persons who have actually
committed crimes involving moral turpitude] to be allowed to remain simply
because there might have been no moral turpitude in the commission by
other individuals (real or hypothetical) of crimes described by the wording of
the same statute under an identical indictment . . . . [However,] [t]he statute
says deportation shall follow when the crime committed involves moral
turpitude, not when that type of crime “commonly” or “usually” does.
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The Attorney General discussed a major argument in
favor of the categorical approach, that of administrative
efficiency.61 He reasoned that “administrative efficiency . . . is
‘secondary to the determination and enforcement of’ statutory
language and ‘obvious legislative intent.’”62 He disagreed with
the BIA’s prior reasoning that permitting inquiry beyond the
record of conviction would provide “no clear stopping point” to
re-litigation of past crimes.63 He stated that his new approach “is
not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself;”64 however, he
provided little guidance to judges on how to determine whether
an offense involved moral turpitude if the statute is divisible. He
merely stated, “[A] hierarchy of evidence certainly may be
appropriate to ensure administrative workability and to avoid
engaging in a retrial of the alien’s prior crime.”65
Of note was the Attorney General’s decision-making
process. The opinion in Silva-Trevino was the result of a secret
process in which he certified the decision to himself without
indicating to the parties that he was considering overhauling
the categorical approach.66 In Mr. Silva-Trevino’s case, the BIA
had decided that his offense was not a CIMT and remanded the
case to the immigration judge to hold a hearing on relief from
removal.67 The BIA’s decision did not question established
precedent on the categorical approach or the standard for
determining whether a crime involves moral turpitude.68 One
year later, Mr. Silva-Trevino’s lawyer was informed by the BIA
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 695 (quoting Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1027-28 (Eisele,
J., dissenting)).
61
See id. at 702; infra notes 208-11. The Attorney General also discussed
why the categorical approach as used in the sentencing context was not a good fit for
immigration cases. First, he reasoned that “moral turpitude” is never an element of a
noncitizen’s prior offense; while it is “simple” for a sentencing court employing the
categorical approach to search for the necessary elements in the statute of conviction
for the prior offense, an immigration court never will find “moral turpitude” listed in
the elements of the statute. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 700-01. The Attorney
General also reasoned that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to removal cases, so
the constitutional concern arising in sentencing cases does not mandate the categorical
approach in immigration cases. See id. at 701.
62
Id. at 702 (quoting Marciano, 450 F.2d at 1029 (Eisele, J., dissenting)).
63
Id. (quoting In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 336 (B.I.A. 1996)).
64
Id. at 703.
65
Id.
66
See Memorandum of Law of Amici Curiae American Immigration Lawyers
Association et al. in Support of Reconsideration 1, 5-6, In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N.
Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008) (No. A013 014 303) [hereinafter Reconsideration Memo],
available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=27391.
67
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 692.
68
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 5 (citing B.I.A. Op. dated Aug. 8, 2006).

2011]

THE NEW MORAL TURPITUDE TEST

1253

that the Attorney General had certified the case to himself.69
The notice did not identify the issues that the Attorney General
would consider; nor did it “define the scope of his
review, . . . provide a briefing schedule, or . . . apprise counsel
of the applicable briefing procedure.”70 Mr. Silva-Trevino’s
attorney attempted to inquire about the reason for referral to
the Attorney General, but received no response.71 Because the
certification order was not made public, stakeholders—
immigrants’ rights organizations, immigration judges, ICE,
and many others—were not given the opportunity to give input
on this drastic change to immigration law.72
The Attorney General decided Silva-Trevino on
November 7, 2008, days after the election results determined
that a new administration would gain control of the DOJ.73 On
November 19, 2008, the decision was first made public and
therefore binding on all future parties.74 Three days later, Mr.
Silva-Trevino’s lawyer received a faxed copy of the decision.75
He filed a motion to reconsider, which included a lengthy
amicus brief signed by several immigrants’ rights
organizations, on December 5, 2008.76 In a one-paragraph order
dated January 15, 2009, (two business days before the Bush
administration left office), Attorney General Mukasey denied
the motion for reconsideration, stating:
Having reviewed the motion and supporting materials, including
briefs submitted by various nonprofit organizations as amici curiae, I
find no basis for reconsideration of the decision. Among other things,
this matter was properly certified and decided in accordance with
settled Department of Justice procedures, and there is no
entitlement to briefing when a matter is certified for Attorney
General review.77

69

Id. Title 8 of the C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i) gives the Attorney General authority
to review any decision by the BIA.
70
Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 470-71 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009);
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 1, 5-6.
71
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 6.
72
See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 470-71 n.11; Reconsideration Memo, supra
note 66, at 6.
73
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
74
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 6; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (2010).
75
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 6.
76
See generally id.
77
Att’y Gen. Order No. 3034-2009 (Jan. 15, 2009) (order denying motion for
reconsideration), available at http://bibdaily.com/pdfs/Silva%20Trevino%20recon%20
denied%201-15-09.pdf.
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Attorney General Mukasey, on his way out of office,
thus introduced and affirmed a new moral turpitude test in
immigration law. Immigration judges, the BIA, and federal
courts were left with the task of implementing the new test.
II.

MANY TYPES OF DEFERENCE

Immigration judges, the BIA, and federal courts now
must grapple with Silva-Trevino’s new moral turpitude test.
An outstanding question is, if the test were challenged in court,
whether the Attorney General’s decision should command
deference by courts under Chevron.78 This section examines
different types of deference in administrative law and discusses
how such deference relates to the type of agency action at issue.
A.

From Skidmore to Chevron Deference

Soon after the New Deal’s “watershed period in the
creation of new federal administrative agencies,”79 courts
agreed that Congress could delegate law-making power to
agencies.80 Courts then had to decide who should have the final
78

Only one circuit court, the Third Circuit, has examined this question in
any detail; this decision is discussed in Part IV, infra. See Jean-Louis v. Attorney
General, 582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit, without significant
discussion, refused to apply Silva-Trevino because it conflicted with the court’s
precedent. See Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902-03 (8th Cir. 2010). The
Seventh Circuit, without discussion, held that it would defer to Silva-Trevino and
remanded for the agency to apply the Silva-Trevino test in the first instance. See MataGuerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit declined to
consider a challenge to the retroactive application of the Silva-Trevino framework; the
court remanded the case because the petitioner’s hearing did not comport with due
process. See Castruita-Gomez v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 421, 422-23 (9th Cir. 2010). The
Ninth Circuit declined to consider another challenge to the Silva-Trevino framework;
the court granted the government’s motion to remand the case to the BIA “in order to
more fully articulate its analysis in a manner consistent with the multi-step approach
set forth in Matter of Silva-Trevino.” Order, Zamudio-Ramirez v. Holder, No. 09-71083
(Apr. 13, 2010). In both Ninth Circuit cases, immigrants’ rights organizations filed
amicus briefs highlighting the various problems with the Attorney General’s decision.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project et al., Castruita-Gomez, 394 F.
App’x 421 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 06-74582) [hereinafter Castruita-Gomez Amicus Brief],
available at http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/webPages/other.htm; Brief of
Amici Curiae Immigrant Defense Project et al., Zamudio-Ramirez v. Holder, No. 0971083 (9th Cir. Mar. 12, 2010) [hereinafter Zamudio-Ramirez Amicus Brief], available
at http://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/webPages/other.htm.
79
JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS 5
(6th ed. 2009).
80
See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-26 (1944) (upholding
Congressional delegation of authority to set prices during wartime, which was
implemented by the Office of Price Administration); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
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say in the interpretation of statutes that delegated such lawmaking power to the agencies: courts or the agencies
themselves. The Supreme Court initially decided that courts
would give a light amount of deference to the agency because of
its technical expertise in the subject matter.81 In Skidmore v.
Swift & Co.,82 the Supreme Court in 1944 described a certain
level of deference that was due to agency decisions:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act [Fair Labor Standards Act], while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and
litigants may properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a
judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.83

The Supreme Court thus decided that the agency’s
technical expertise and manner in which it decided an issue of
statutory interpretation gave it the “power to persuade” a
court.84 Over the course of forty years, however, the Court
changed its opinion on just how persuasive an agency’s
interpretation was.
In its 1984 decision, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC,85 the
Supreme Court held that a reviewing court should defer to the
agency’s reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous term that
appears in the statute the agency was charged to administer.86
The Court held,

Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447 (1987) (discussing
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which invalidated the
National Industrial Recovery Act as an unconstitutional delegation of law-making
power, and stating that “[t]he constitutional assault eventually disintegrated in the
face of prolonged and persistent popular support of regulatory administration”).
81
Professor Colin Diver discusses different forms of deference that courts
may give to agency decisions. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565-66 (1985). He argues that under one
interpretation of Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134 (1944), courts should give no more
than “courteous regard” to agency decisions. See id. at 565.
82
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
83
Id. at 140.
84
Id.; see also Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind
Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 13 (1990) [hereinafter Anthony, Agency
Interpretations] (referring to this analysis as “Skidmore consideration,” under which
“the agency interpretation is a substantial input and counts for something . . . [b]ut the
authoritative act of interpretation remains with the court”).
85
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
86
Id. at 843-44.
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[i]f Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute.87

In what is famously known as the Chevron two-step analysis,88
first a reviewing court, “employing traditional tools of statutory
construction,”89 determines whether the statute is ambiguous. If
the statute is clear, the court gives effect to that meaning.90 If
the statute is ambiguous, the court defers to the agency’s
interpretation, so long as it is reasonable.91 In determining
whether a given interpretation is reasonable, “[t]he court need
not conclude that the agency construction was the only one it
permissibly could have adopted to uphold the construction, or
even the reading the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.”92
The Court justified the rule by reasoning that the agency’s
expertise surpassed that of a court when the question involved a
technically complex issue.93 Issues that agencies regulate also
involve competing interests from several parties; the Court
reasoned that Congress may not have desired to wade into the
fray and preferred to delegate the question to the more expert
agency.94 If Congress used ambiguous terms, even if “unable to
87

Id.
See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 190. Scholars have debated
how many steps Chevron has. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss,
Chevron’s Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); but see Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian
Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009).
89
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. Scholars have discussed what the “traditional
tools of statutory construction” are. See, e.g., Kenneth Bamberger, Normative Canons in
the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L.J. 64, 75-78 (2008).
90
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
91
Id. at 844.
92
Id. at 843 n.11.
93
Id. at 865. “The leading [normative] theory for Chevron is that agencies
have greater policy expertise than courts.” Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2135 (2002). Professor Cass
Sunstein cites this theory’s roots in legal realism: “Perhaps the two-step inquiry is
based on a healthy recognition that in the face of ambiguity, agency decisions must rest
on judgments of value, and those judgments should be made by political rather than
judicial institutions.” Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 197. However,
Professor Elhauge writes that the “the legal realists’ hope that legal ambiguities could
be resolved by objective policy expertise has long ago grown quaint.” Elhauge, supra, at
2135. This is because expertise cannot resolve which statutory interpretation has the
“best” policy implications; also, “[i]n practice, it is rare to find a field of social policy
where there are no experts on opposing sides of an issue, each retained by a rival camp,
undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.” Id.
94
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (“Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the
[agency] to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great[er] expertise
88
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forge a coalition on either side of the question,”95 it could satisfy all
constituents by simply deflecting the details to the agency.96
Chevron greatly expanded the level of deference that a
court would give to an agency’s interpretation of a statute,97
creating a significant break from Skidmore.98 Although praised for
the clear line that it drew for courts reviewing agency action,99

and charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better
position to do so.”).
95
Id.
96
Scholars cite the political justifications for the Chevron doctrine,
explaining why Congress delegates interpretive authority to the agency. See, e.g., Lisa
Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549, 566-71 (2009) [hereinafter
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake]. Professor Bressman describes that under a positive
political theory, Congress is composed of members who wish to spend time on activities
that improve their re-election chances; members lack both time and expertise to devote
to technically complex issues, so they delegate them to agencies. Id. at 566-67 (citing
David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Separation of
Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947, 962-67 (1999)).
Congress never has time to develop the expertise needed; moreover, Congress cannot
efficiently convert any expertise directly into law because all decisions made by
legislative committees must pass through the floor, which works as a policy middle
man that can alter legislation. Id. at 567 (citing Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 96,
at 967). Agencies, on the other hand, are not hampered by this process and their
rulings can become law directly. Id. She cites Congress’ desire to “write just enough
policy to receive a positive response for its actions, while deflecting any negative
attention for the burdensome details to the agency.” Id. at 568. In addition, “Congress
may choose . . . ambiguous words to obtain consensus,” since both parties can claim a
victory and then later influence agency decision makers to support their own legislative
agendas when sorting out the details. Id. at 571. “By choosing words that ‘mean all
things to all people,’ Congress can obtain the requisite support to enact a bill while
preserving opportunities to recommence the battle at another time and in another
place.” Id. at 571-72 (citing and quoting Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative
Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB. POL’Y 287, 290 (1989)); see also Elhauge, supra note 93,
at 2127 (interpreting Chevron as a default rule that constrains judges to maximize
political preference satisfaction because “[t]he policy views that govern actions of
agency heads . . . generally come about as close to an accurate barometer of current
political preferences as courts can get”).
97
Professor Sunstein states that “shortly after it appeared, Chevron was
quickly taken to establish a new approach to judicial review of agency interpretations
of law, going so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury for the administrative state.”
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 188-89; cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.”).
98
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 853-56; see also Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citations omitted) (“Skidmore deference to authoritative agency views is an
anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency interpretations
(including interpretive regulations, as opposed to ‘legislative rules’) authoritative
effect . . . . That era came to an end with our watershed decision in Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.”).
99
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 512 (1989).
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Chevron left many questions unanswered in administrative law.100
One such unanswered question was how the agency’s use of
procedures affects a reviewing court’s deference.
B.

United States v. Mead Corporation: Deference Tailored
to the Agency’s Procedures

The Supreme Court has determined that an agency has
a great deal of discretion in determining the type of procedure
to employ when it sets policy.101 However, in United States v.
Mead Corporation,102 the Supreme Court in 2001 held that an
agency’s choice of procedures affect whether that decision will
command Chevron deference.
An agency can make a decision through a spectrum of
formal and informal procedures.103 On one end of the spectrum
is notice-and-comment rulemaking.104 Courts have interpreted
100

See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 840-52 (discussing fourteen
questions left unresolved by Chevron and four decisions in which Court attempted to
answer some of the unresolved questions).
101
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (Chenery II); see also
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 765-66 (1969) (plurality opinion) (refusing
to compel agency to establish law through rulemaking process before applying it in
adjudication); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974) (holding that a
reviewing court only will examine the agency’s choice of procedures under the “abuse of
discretion” standard). The Supreme Court in Chenery II stated: “To insist upon one
form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over necessity.” Chenery II,
332 U.S. at 202. However, the Court expressed a preference for rulemaking: “[t]he
function of filling in the interstices of the [statute] should be performed, as much as
possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the
future.” Id. The Court recognized that adjudication often may be necessary to set policy
because “[p]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not
reasonably foresee,” or “the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a
particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast
rule,” or even that “the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be
impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule.” Id. at 202-03.
102
533 U.S. 218 (2001).
103
Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449 (2005) [hereinafter Bressman, How Mead
Has Muddled] (“All procedures are not created equal.”). Not all agencies have the
authority to engage in a range of policy-making tools; Congress determines which types
of policy-making tools an agency can use. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice
of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1386-90 (2004).
104
In this article, I refer to informal rulemaking as “notice-and-comment
rulemaking” or “rulemaking.” Informal rulemaking is governed by 5 U.S.C. § 553. The
term “informal” distinguishes this form of rulemaking from formal rulemaking, which
requires an oral hearing complete with procedural requirements. Congress directs
agencies as to which form of rulemaking to employ; when the statute requires rules to
be made “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,” the agency should
engage in formal rulemaking, governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556 and 557. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(c) (2008). Because agencies utilize informal rulemaking more often than formal
rulemaking, in this article, I discuss informal rulemaking as one end of the “process”
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the notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in such a way that these
procedures have “come to resemble an elaborate ‘paper
hearing.’”105 An agency must provide supporting documentation
with the notice of proposed rulemaking, respond in detail to all
substantial comments, and proffer a lengthy justification for
the final rule, including explanations of why it rejected
alternatives.106 As one scholar states, “notice-and-comment
rulemaking fosters logical and thorough consideration of
policy . . . [and] promotes predictability . . ., [a]t a minimum, it
allows affected parties, who participate in the formulation of a
rule, to anticipate the rule and plan accordingly.”107
Adjudications fall somewhere in the middle of this
spectrum.108 They provide important procedural protections to
individual litigants, as they result from a detailed trial-like
gathering of evidence by the agency.109 While normally binding
only on the parties to that proceeding, many orders operate as
precedent, which will bind future parties.110 Compared to
spectrum. See MASHAW, MERRILL & SHANE, supra note 79, at 507-10 (discussing
statutes that require formal rulemaking, many of which were enacted prior to the
APA); see also id. at 509-10 (discussing cases in which agencies abandoned programs
because statutes mandating formal rulemaking made implementation of a new policy
“virtually impossible”).
105
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility, Procedural Formality, and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory
Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528, 553 (2006); Magill, supra note 103, at 1390-91
(“[T]oday, promulgating an important legislative rule is a labor-intensive enterprise.
While there are many reasons for this, it is unquestionably due in part to judicially
imposed requirements that an agency must follow if it expects to survive a challenge to
its action in court . . . .”).
106
See Stephenson, supra note 105, at 553-54 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); La. Fed. Land Bank
Ass’n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336 F.3d 1075, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Conn. Light &
Power Co. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 673 F.2d 525, 530-32 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
107
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 542 (2003) [hereinafter
Bressman, Beyond Accountability].
108
See id.
109
See Magill, supra note 103, at 1391. There are two types of adjudications,
formal and informal. Formal adjudications, which are governed by 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556,
and 557, are mandated when the statute requires a hearing to be “on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing.” These are trial-type procedures, which include
requirements that the parties be given notice of the “matters of fact and law asserted,”
§ 554(b)(3), an opportunity for “the submission and consideration of facts [and]
arguments,” § 554(c)(1), and an opportunity to submit “proposed findings and
conclusions” or “exceptions,” § 557(c)(1), (2). Informal adjudications, the basic
requirements of which are set forth in § 555, do not mandate such procedures. See 5
U.S.C. § 555 (2010).
110
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 542 (noting that
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) frequently uses adjudication as a policy-
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rulemaking, adjudications as policy-making tools for agencies
do not provide opportunity for input to the same extent because
they involve only a limited class of persons.111 Adjudications
also may not be able to issue broad pronouncements in the
same way as rulemaking because they are tailored to the facts
of an individual litigant’s case, which may lead to bad facts
making bad law.112 Additionally, adjudications create
retroactive rules because the agency applies the new policy to
the individual whose case is before it.113
On the other end of the spectrum are procedures such as
guidance documents, policy statements, and interpretive
rules.114 This guidance can appear in manuals used by agency
personnel, private letter rulings, advice given over the phone,
and public notices such as press releases or congressional
testimony.115 While these procedures assure virtually no public
input or deliberation and do not have binding effect, they are
making tool); Magill, supra note 103, at 1385 (noting that the NLRB and the Federal
Trade Commission largely make policy by adjudicating individual cases, whereas the
Federal Communications Commission does so by promulgating legislative rules); see
also Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 693, 695 (2005) (“Even though most agencies possess general policymaking
processes, administrative adjudications remain a critical part of administrative
policymaking.”).
111
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 542; Magill,
supra note 103, at 1391, 1396. In his dissenting opinion in Wyman-Gordon, Justice
Douglas praised the value of rule-making procedures for its facilitation of input from
the public:
Agencies discover that they are not always repositories of ultimate wisdom;
they learn from the suggestions of outsiders and often benefit from that
advice . . . . Public airing of problems through rulemaking makes the
bureaucracy more responsive to public needs and is an important brake on
the growth of absolutism in the regime that now governs all of us.
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-78 (1969) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
112
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 542; Magill,
supra note 103, at 1396.
113
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 542. But see
Magill, supra note 103, at 1435 (noting an example in which courts required the NLRB
to apply a new policy announced in adjudication prospectively only).
114
Interpretive rules explain a statute or regulation; they are interpretations
of already-existing legal norms and therefore do not have legal effects on private
parties. See Magill, supra note 103, at 1386, 1412.
115
Id. at 1391. Professor Magill states the purposes for such guidance:
Some of these instruments are designed to control the discretion of the
agency’s front-line bureaucrats, some to advise regulated parties how to
comply with regulatory requirements or how the agency will exercise its
enforcement discretion, and others to advance the agency’s position about its
authority with respect to a one-time but important controversy.
Id. at 1391-92.
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less costly and more efficient for an agency.116 Which procedure
should an agency choose to make policy? How does the choice of
procedures interface with the Chevron doctrine?
In Mead, the Court examined a Customs Service tariff
ruling letter, which set tariff classifications for particular
imports.117 The ruling letters represented the official position of
the Customs Service with respect to the particular transaction,
yet were subject to modification or revocation without notice to
any person other than the person to whom the letter was
addressed.118 The regulations governing such letters provided
that they were binding only on the party to that transaction:
“no other person should rely on the ruling letter or assume that
the principles of that ruling will be applied in connection with
any transaction other than the one described in the letter.”119
The ruling letters were not subject to notice and comment
before being issued and generally could be modified without
notice and comment.120 They did not need to be published; they
needed only to be made “available for public inspection.”121 Any
of the forty-six port-of-entry Customs offices or the Customs
Headquarters Office could issue such ruling letters.122
Additionally, most ruling letters contained little or no
reasoning, although the letter at issue in the case set out its
rationale in some detail.123
Discussing whether Chevron deference should be given
to such ruling letters, the Court held that an agency
interpretation merits Chevron deference “when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority.”124 The Court reasoned that Congress
can explicitly or implicitly delegate legislative power to an
agency to fill in the details of a statutory ambiguity,125 and that
express authorization to engage in the process of rulemaking or
adjudication is a “very good indicator of delegation meriting
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125

See id.
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 222, 224-25 (2001).
Id. at 222-23 (citing 19 C.F.R. §§ 177.9(a), (c) (2000)).
Id. at 223 (quoting 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c)).
Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (1996); 19 C.F.R. § 177.10(c)).
Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a)).
Id. at 224 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.11(a)).
Id.
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 229.
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Chevron treatment.”126 Linking Chevron deference to formal
procedures, the Court held, “[i]t is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of
law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that
should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”127 The Court
noted that the overwhelming majority of cases applying
Chevron deference involved review of the fruits of notice-andcomment rulemaking or formal adjudication, yet acknowledged
that it sometimes accorded Chevron deference to agency
decisions without such administrative formality.128
The Court refused Chevron deference to the rulings
letter at issue in Mead because such letters were “best treated
like ‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency
manuals, and enforcement guidelines.’”129 Therefore, the letters
lacked the “force of law.”130 The Court did not, however, entirely
disregard the agency’s interpretation and conduct a de novo
review of the legal question. Rather, the Court reverted to its
pre-Chevron level of deference under Skidmore, which gave
some, but not automatic, deference to an agency’s decision.131
The Court recognized the myriad of administrative statutes
and reasoned that there is more than one variety of judicial
deference.132 The Court thus remanded the case for
consideration of whether the agency’s decision was due some
deference because of its specialized knowledge.133
126

Id.
Id. at 230.
128
Id. at 230-31.
129
Id. at 234 (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
130
Id.
131
Id. (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944)).
132
Id. at 236.
133
Id. at 235, 239. Mead was not the first time the Court opined about the
level of Chevron deference to be given to administrative procedures that were less
formal than notice-and-comment rulemaking. In Christensen, the Court considered
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) prohibited a State or subdivision thereof
from compelling employees to utilize accrued compensatory time in lieu of paying it out
to the employees. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 580-81. The county had written to the U.S.
Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, who wrote an opinion letter
interpreting the FLSA and regulations to preclude the county from compelling such use
of compensatory time. Id. The Court rejected the petitioners’ claim that the county
violated the FLSA, reasoning that the petitioners’ reading of the statute, the reading
shared by the Department of Labor in its opinion letter, was “backwards.” Id. at 588. In
its discussion of whether the Department of Labor’s opinion letter merited Chevron
deference, the Court stated:
127

Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in an opinion letter,
not one arrived at after, for example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-
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The Supreme Court in Mead did not set a hard-and-fast
rule that only agency interpretations resulting from formal noticeand-comment rulemaking deserved Chevron deference. In fact, two
years after the Mead decision, the Court rejected an argument that
only agency interpretations resulting from notice-and-comment
rulemaking merited Chevron deference.134 This failure to set a clear
rule is one of scholars’ criticisms of the decision.135 Mead has been
both praised and disparaged; its meaning has been the topic of
much scholarship following the decision.
C.

Exploring Chevron Step Zero

Scholars and courts alike have pondered the meaning of
the Mead136 and, particularly, the threshold question of
comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters—like
interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant
Chevron-style deference . . . . Instead, interpretations contained in formats
such as opinion letters are “entitled to respect” under our decision in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., but only to the extent that those interpretations
have the “power to persuade.”
Id. at 587 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
134
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002). In Barnhart, at issue was the
Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the meaning of “disability.” Id. at
214. The agency had recently, “perhaps in response to this litigation,” promulgated
regulations to answer the question at issue in the case. The Court deferred to the
agency’s reasonable interpretation, partly because it was issued through notice-andcomment rulemaking, but also because it was a long-standing interpretation, which the
agency had previously expressed through less formal procedures. Id. at 221. The Court
stated, “the fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through means
less formal than ‘notice and comment’ rulemaking does not automatically deprive that
interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due.” Id. (citation omitted).
135
See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1475;
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 193. Several scholars argue that the
Court “wanted to regain the interpretive power that courts lost to Chevron by
increasing the hurdles that agencies face under Chevron.” Bressman, How Mead Has
Muddled, supra note 103, at 1482. In this sense, Mead is seen as a power grab by
courts. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 225 (2001) (hypothesizing that the Mead Court’s rhetoric about
congressional intent may be to “cloak judicial aggrandizement”); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the
Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 751 (2002) (arguing that Mead
“represents a naked power grab by the federal courts”); see also Elhauge, supra note 93,
at 2157 n.463 (discussing the assumption that judges intend to maximize their own
statutory preferences).
136
See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1475;
Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and Standards, Meta-Rules and MetaStandards, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 833 (2002) [hereinafter Merrill, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards] (“[Mead] comes up short in terms of articulating a meta-rule to guide
lower courts in future controversies.”); Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at
193 (criticizing Mead’s “force of law” test as “a crude way of determining whether
Chevron deference is appropriate”); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
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“Chevron step zero—the initial inquiry into whether the
Chevron framework applies at all.”137 The Mead Court left
undefined what it means for an agency decision to have the
“force of law.”138 Professor Thomas Merrill identifies three
factors relevant to whether a decision has the force of law: “(1)
whether Congress has prescribed relatively formal procedures;
(2) whether Congress has authorized the agency to adopt rules
or precedents that generalize to more than a single case; and
(3) whether Congress has authorized the agency to prescribe
legal norms that apply uniformly throughout its jurisdiction.”139
Accordingly, justifications for Mead given by court opinions and
scholarship divide into three categories: (1) the importance of
procedures; (2) the importance of binding effect; and (3) the
importance of authoritativeness.
1. The Importance of Procedures
Some courts have interpreted Mead to require agencies
to use procedures that guarantee public participation in order
to pass Chevron step zero.140 Other courts have indicated that

Serv., 316 F.3d 913, 921 (9th Cir.) (“After Mead, we are certain of only two things about
the continuum of deference owed to agency decisions: Chevron provides an example of
when Chevron applies, and Mead provides an example of when it does not.”), rev’d en
banc 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
137
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 191 (attributing the term
“Chevron Step Zero” to Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 836). In his article Chevron
Step Zero, Professor Sunstein discusses the force of law holding in Mead and the related
cases of Barnhart and Christensen. See id. at 211-31. He also discusses a separate Step
Zero trilogy involving Chevron deference when the agency is deciding interstitial or major
questions. See id. at 231-47 (discussing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218
(1994), Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995),
and FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
138
See Merrill, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 813
(stating that the Mead Court did not identify the triggering conditions for determining
when an agency has been given the power to act with the force of law).
139
Id. at 814. Professor Merrill discussed a possible fourth factor, “whether the
agency had sought to exercise such authority,” which he discounted because the Mead
Court collapsed this inquiry into the question of whether Congress authorized the agency
to act with authority. Id. at 814 n.41. He also discussed a fifth factor, “whether Congress
has provided for de novo review of the agency action that incorporates the interpretation,”
which he discounted because the Court held in United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526
U.S. 380, 394 (1999), that an agency’s regulation merits Chevron deference
notwithstanding a statutory provision of de novo review by a court. Id.
140
For example, in Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314 F.3d 875 (7th Cir. 2002),
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused Chevron deference to a Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Statement of Policy because of the lack of
formal procedures that preceeded the agency interpretation. See id. at 881. The Court
reasoned,
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procedures, while necessary to the step zero question, are
weighed with other factors such as whether the agency’s
decision had binding effect.141 Why is an agency’s choice of
procedures so critical to the Mead inquiry?
Several scholars have discussed the importance of
procedural formality to Mead’s “force of law” test. Professor
Cass Sunstein reads Mead as “motivated by a concern that
Chevron deference would ensure an insufficient safeguard
against agency decisions not preceded by formal procedures.”142
By awarding Chevron deference to agency decisions reached
through formal procedures, Mead “attempt[s] to carry forward
a central theme in administrative law: developing surrogate
safeguards for the protections in the Constitution itself.”143
Formal procedures promote “‘fairness and deliberation’ by, for
example, giving people an opportunity to be heard and offering

[i]f an agency is to assume the judicial prerogative of statutory interpretation
that Chevron bestowed upon it, it must use . . . something more formal, more
deliberate, than a simple announcement. A simple announcement is too far
removed from the process by which courts interpret statutes to earn
deference.
Id.; see also Vill. of Barrington v. Surface Transp. Bd., No. 09-1002, 2011 WL 869904, at
*8 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2011) (applying Mead to grant Chevron deference to an informal
agency decision because the proceedings in the case included several Federal Register
notices and many opportunities for public participation prior to the agency’s decision);
Freeman v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 626 F.3d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 2010) (refusing Chevron
deference to a HUD Statement of Policy and reasoning, “[w]here the agency has not used
a deliberative process such as notice-and-comment rulemaking, or where the process by
which the agency reached its interpretation is unclear, the court cannot presume
Congress intended to grant the interpretation the force of law”); but see Rubie’s Costume
Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that a Customs
classification ruling, which was published pursuant to a deliberative notice-and-comment
rulemaking process, was not entitled to Chevron deference because the court read Mead
to deny Chevron deference to all Customs classification rulings).
141
In an opinion written only days after Mead, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit awarded Chevron deference to a formal advisory opinion of the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) because the interpretation resulted from a process in
which the FEC made its advisory opinion public and received written comments by all
interested parties; in addition, the advisory opinions had binding legal effect because
any person involved in a materially indistinguishable transaction could rely on the
opinion. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d 173, 185-86
(D.C. Cir. 2001). The court reasoned that the formal procedures and binding effect of
the FEC advisory opinion distinguished it from the Labor Department letter, which the
Court held did not merit Chevron deference in Christensen. See id. at 186 (citing
Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587); see also Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1142-45 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting Chevron deference to a U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service policy statement because it resulted from “procedural rigors”
of notice-and-comment and the policy was treated as legally binding).
142
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 227.
143
Id. at 225.
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reasoned responses to what people have to say,”144 whereas
“informal processes . . . are unlikely to promote values of
participation and deliberation.”145 Professors Thomas Merrill
and Kristin Hickman write that the “correspondence between
the delegation to act with the force of law and the existence of
rights of public participation is not accidental”146 because
“[g]eneral norms of democratic governance and traditions of
due process both stress the importance of affording affected
persons the right to be heard before they are subjected to the
coercive power of the state.”147
In addition, formal procedures maintain constitutional
checks and balances between the three branches of government
by ensuring transparency, which prevents problems in the lawmaking process such as faction (agency capture by wellorganized interest groups) and government self-interest
(government actors pursuing their own self-interest to the
public detriment).148 Formal procedures allow affected parties to
detect improper motives by government actors or expose
agency capture by a well-organized interest group, and thus
assign blame to the appropriate agency actors.149
Scholars argue that Mead allows agencies to engage in a
cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of formal procedures,
which command deference, against the more efficient and
inexpensive informal rulings, which risk being overruled by a
reviewing court.150 Professor Matthew Stephenson interprets
144

Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001)).
Id.; see also Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 234 (“[T]he [Mead] Court’s
focus appears to follow from the view that deference should depend on whether agency
action has a connection to the public and whether that action results from disciplined
consideration.”).
146
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 886. While Professors Merrill and
Hickman were not writing in response to the Mead decision, as it had not yet been
published, they discussed the “force of law” holding in Christensen in their article Chevron’s
Domain. See id. at 882-88 (citing Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 576 (2000)).
147
See id. at 886.
148
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 496-98; Sunstein,
Constitutionalism After the New Deal, supra note 80, at 450.
149
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 506.
150
See id. at 539 (“The law-like decisionmaking requirement . . . ensure[s]
that agencies put their money where their mouths are.”); E. Donald Elliott,
Reinventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1491 (1992) (“As in the television
commercial in which the automobile repairman intones ominously ‘pay me now, or pay
me later,’ the agency has a choice: It can go through the procedural effort of making a
legislative rule now and avoid the burdens of case-by-case justification down the road,
or it can avoid the hassle of rulemaking now, but at the price of having to engage in
more extensive, case-by-case justification down the road.”); Merrill, Meta-Rules and
Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 822 (“It is now clear, agencies must make a certain
investment in administrative processes to obtain the Chevron payoff. In the vocabulary
145
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the rationale in Mead to have arisen “because courts tend to
view formal process as a proxy for variables that the court
considers important but cannot observe directly, such as the
significance of the issue to the agency’s mission or the degree to
which the agency’s judgment reflects a sensible balancing of
the relevant considerations.”151 Thus, agencies that want to
advocate a more aggressive reading of a statute “must decide
whether it is worth paying the costs associated with formal
procedures in order to ‘purchase’ greater judicial toleration of a
more aggressive interpretation of the statute.”152 He argues that
Mead increases an agency’s incentive to use more formal
procedures if the agency desires an aggressive reading of a
statute; agency interpretations made through less formal
procedures must be more textually plausible in order to
command Chevron deference.153 Because Mead allows only
formal procedures to invoke Chevron deference, whereas
informal procedures receive the less deferential Skidmore
review, “the legal system, considered as a whole, will provide
an ample check on agency discretion and the risk that it will be
exercised arbitrarily—in one case, through relatively formal
procedures and in another, through a relatively careful judicial
check on agency interpretations of law.”154

of Christensen and Mead, agencies must take whatever procedural steps are necessary to
assure that their interpretation has the ‘force of law.’”); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5,
at 887 (“If an agency is willing to treat an interpretation as legally binding, and in so
doing to subject itself to the procedural requirements associated with action that is legally
binding, then the agency would be ‘rewarded’ by having its interpretation given
mandatory deference by the courts.”); Stephenson, supra note 105, at 547-48 (“The very
costliness of formal procedures provides [a reviewing] court with valuable information
about how important the interpretive question at issue is to the agency’s policy agenda.”);
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 225-26 (“Mead puts agencies to a salutary
choice; it essentially says, ‘Pay me now or pay me later.’ Under Mead, agencies may
proceed expeditiously and informally, in which case they can invoke Skidmore but not
Chevron, or they may act more formally, in which case Chevron applies.”).
151
Stephenson, supra note 105, at 530-31. “The court may, for example,
believe that procedural formality facilitates the accurate evaluation of complex issues,
promotes reasoned deliberation, or prevents special-interest capture.” Id. at 547-48. He
writes, “although procedural formality and textual plausibility increase the agency’s
odds of surviving judicial review, they are also both costly to the agency.” Id. at 531.
152
Id. But see Ronald M. Levin, Mead and the Prospective Exercise of
Discretion, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 771, 796-97 (2002) (reasoning that agencies rarely
consider the standard of review when deciding which formal procedure to follow).
153
Stephenson, supra note 105, at 534.
154
See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 226.
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Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman interprets Mead
through a positive political theory lens:155 as an important tool
in the Congressional oversight of agencies.156 She cites two
theories of monitoring mechanisms: “police patrols,” which are
direct forms of oversight such as committee hearings,157 and
“fire alarms,” which enlist private parties to gather information
and notify Congress of proposed changes to regulatory policy.158
Congress can use administrative procedures to place
constituents into the administrative process, where they may
alert members of Congress to agency action that will change
the status quo before the action is final.159 The procedures “thus
shift monitoring costs from Congress to its constituents.”160
Mead, which requires agencies to use such procedures, ensures
that Congress maintains proper oversight over agency action.161
Critical to this analysis is the question of where to strike the
balance—agencies need only use procedures that provide
enough information to constituents to facilitate “fire alarm”
oversight; any additional procedures merely add cost without
providing more information.162
Critics reason that the Court’s holding in Mead requires
too many procedures, which consume agency time and

155

Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 567 (citing Epstein &
O’Halloran, supra note 96, at 962). For a more detailed discussion of positive political
theory see supra note 96.
156
Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 580. Professor Bressman
notes that while Mead values procedures—which are a mechanism to facilitate
legislative monitoring—Mead “botches the implementation” because it links procedures
to rule-of-law values, as opposed to legislative monitoring. Id.
157
Id. at 570 (citing Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz,
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 165, 166 (1984)).
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
See id.; see also Elhauge, supra note 93, at 2145 (discussing the Mead case
and stating, “the reason the doctrine depends not just on how much power the agency
was granted, but on how the agency exercises its power, is that only certain methods of
exercise provide the reasonable assurance that the agency action reflects current
governmental preferences”). Professor Bressman interprets the case of Barnhart
through the lens of informational oversight by Congress. In Barnhart, the Court gave
deference to the agency, not because of the procedures used, but for a number of other
reasons, one of which was the longstanding nature of the agency’s position. Bressman,
Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 582 (citing Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222
(2002)). This is another way that Congress ensures that the agency reflects
congressional preferences, because Congress can “rely on positions that the agency has
maintained before or taken during the course of legislative drafting.” Id. at 583.
162
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1785 (2007) [hereinafter Bressman, Procedures as Politics].
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resources; the result is an ossification of administrative law.163
The most formal of procedures commonly used by agencies,
notice-and-comment rulemaking, “both symboliz[es] and
amplif[ies] all that the public finds most distasteful in
government.”164 However, “the Constitution strikes a balance
between efficiency and procedural formality, committing us to a
certain degree, perhaps a large degree, of inefficiency. As the
onerous requirements of the legislative process attest,
efficiency often yields to procedural formality and the values it
secures.”165 Also, the Mead Court did not require agencies to use
the most formal procedures to command Chevron deference;166
standard procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking
and adjudication are mere examples of the types of procedures
that are acceptable to guarantee Chevron deference.167 Professor
Bressman states, “unmitigated formalism is neither necessary
nor wise. We instead should afford Congress or agencies a little
leeway to create administrative law-making procedures beyond
trial-type or paper hearings, but require that those procedures
adhere to certain specified limits—in particular, that the
resulting policy is transparent, rational, and binding.”168
2. The Importance of Binding Effect
Several courts have emphasized the importance of
binding effect to the Mead holding.169 Some courts have
163

See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s opinion would ossify statutory law because the
agency’s flexibility to interpret the law in a new way would cease upon the first judicial
resolution of the question); Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 230-31 (“These
procedures consume significant agency time and resources and thereby inhibit needed
regulatory (or, for that matter, deregulatory) initiatives. Mead inevitably will channel
additional agency action into this already overburdened administrative mechanism, as
agencies sometimes adopt notice-and-comment procedures for no other reason than to
gain Chevron deference.”); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
“Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385-86 (1992). But see
Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at 1819, nn.381-82 (discussing
empirical studies that have shown administrative procedures do not ossify practice).
164
Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 232.
165
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1490-91.
166
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
167
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1450.
168
Id.
169
See, e.g., Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“In light of Mead, the ‘essential factor’ in determining whether an agency action
warrants Chevron deference is its precedential value.”); High Sierra Hikers Ass’n v.
Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 647 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to extend Chevron deference to
a Forest Service permitting decision because the agency was not “acting in a way that
would have precedential value for subsequent parties”).
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concluded that binding effect alone is instructive on whether an
agency action passes Chevron step zero,170 whereas others have
emphasized both binding effect and the formality of procedures
to the Mead inquiry.171
Scholars also have discussed the importance of binding
effect to the Chevron step zero inquiry. Professor Ronald Levin
argues that the Mead inquiry should turn not on what
procedures were used, but whether the agency action is
binding, i.e., it “alters or determines legal rights or
obligations.”172 Professor Sunstein writes that the Mead inquiry
can turn on either the formality of the agency’s procedures or
the binding effect of the agency’s decision.173 Professor
Bressman also writes that both binding effect and procedural
formalities were important to the Court’s holding in Mead.174
She describes “binding effect” as “immediate and irrevocable
until officially renounced . . .”;175 thus, “[b]inding effect is the
promise of consistent application.”176 She views Mead as an
application of the constitutional requirements for law
making—careful consideration, transparency, and consistent
application—to agency action.177 In this sense, Mead’s “law-like
decision-making requirement” ensures that agencies exercise
170

For example, in Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d
1051, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a prior panel
ruling that extended Chevron deference to a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service permit
because of the public participation in the process. See id.; Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish
& Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d at 922. The en banc panel held that the permit did not merit
Chevron deference because it would not bind the agency in permitting other activity.
See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d at 1068; see also Schneider
v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 143, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the tables to guide
compensation under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, although
not subject to formal rulemaking procedures, were entitled to Chevron deference
because they applied equally to all claimants seeking compensation from the Fund).
171
See Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136,
th
1142-45 (9 Cir. 2007); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 254 F.3d 173,
185-86 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
172
See Levin, supra note 152, at 775; see also id. at 794-96 (arguing that
Mead’s requirement of procedures to guarantee Chevron deference was unnecessary
because the administrative requirements of finality and ripeness already require an
agency to carefully consider the implications of its positions).
173
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 222-26. Professor Sunstein
writes that an agency decision has the “force of law” if it is “binding on private parties
in the sense that those who act in violation of the decision face immediate
sanctions . . . [and] if the agency is legally bound by it as well.” Id. At 222. He reasons,
however, that both binding effect and formality of procedures are important to the
Mead “force of law” holding. See id. at 223-26.
174
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1488-89.
175
Id. at 1489.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1479-80.
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their policy-making authority “in ways that generally promote
consistency and specifically prevent ad hoc departures at the
behest of narrow interests.”178
Professor Robert Anthony, an original proponent of the
position the Court eventually adopted in Mead,179 argues that
an agency’s decision should not have the “force of law,” or
binding effect, unless the agency has used formal procedures to
reach the decision.180 He defines an agency decision with
“binding effect” as one that “is to be applied rigidly to private
persons without first affording them a realistic chance to
challenge its policy,”181 whereas if the agency “is open to
reconsideration of the policy, the document shows neither the
intent to bind nor such an effect.”182 He defends his position by
citing the values of fairness, transparency, and deliberation
inherent in the rulemaking process, all of which lend
legitimacy to the agency’s decision.183 He writes: “The accuracy
and thoroughness of an agency’s actions are enhanced by the
requirement that it invite and consider the comments of all the
world, including those of directly affected persons who are able,
often uniquely, to supply pertinent information and analysis.”184
3. The Importance of Authoritativeness
Scholars also have discussed the importance of an
agency decision’s authoritativeness to the Mead analysis.185 By
178

Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 539; see also id. (“By
announcing a rule that binds all similarly situated parties, agencies may stem requests
for deviations except through official channels.”).
179
See Anthony, Agency Interpretations, supra note 84.
180
See id. at 4; see also Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy
Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to
Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1314-15 (1992) [hereinafter Anthony, Interpretive
Rules].
181
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 180, at 1330.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1373.
184
Id.; see also Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory
Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 403 (“[A]n agency may receive more cooperation and less
obstruction from regulated interests that have a hand in shaping the rules within
which they must function.”); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal
Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 409 (citing as a benefit of notice-andcomment rulemaking that the agency receives useful information from previously
unknown sources and its decision is subject to the discipline of having to respond to
these comments).
185
Courts interpreting Mead generally have focused on the agency’s choice of
procedures and whether those procedures have binding effect, as opposed to the
authoritative nature of the decision. See, e.g., Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish &
Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2007); Krzalic v. Republic Title Co., 314
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this reasoning, the procedures used by the agency are of little
importance to the Chevron deference question. As stated by
Professor Sunstein, “[i]f policymaking expertise and democratic
accountability are relevant, then perhaps Congress should be
understood to have delegated law-interpreting power whether
or not formal procedures are involved.”186 Professor Sunstein
suggests that the formality of the procedures used may not be
the sole reason that the Mead Court refused to give the tariff
ruling letters Chevron deference. Rather, the Court emphasized
the number of such letters produced every year; in this way,
“Mead emerges as a highly pragmatic case resting on the
evident problems with deferring to the numerous lower-level
functionaries who produce mere letter rulings.”187
Professor David Barron and now Justice Elena Kagan
argue that Chevron deference should depend on who is making
the decision within the agency, not how the decision is made.188
They agree with the Mead Court that “deference should depend
on whether agency action has a connection to the public and
whether that action results from disciplined consideration.”189
However, they argue that those values—connection to the public
(namely, accountability) and discipline—can be served by courts
giving Chevron deference only to decisions made by the head of
the agency.190 They discuss what a statutory delegatee—the
F.3d 875, 881 (7th Cir. 2002). Other courts, instead of examining how the agency made
the decision at issue, have focused only on whether Congress gave the agency the
authority to act with the force of law. See, e.g., Local 446 v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341,
354 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Several courts have applied the multi-factor set forth in the
Supreme Court’s decision in Barnhart, which made Chevron deference depend on the
complexity of the statutory scheme, the agency’s expertise and the careful
consideration the agency had given to the issue over a long period of time. See
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002); Mylan Labs. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d
1272, 447 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Kruse v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., 383 F.3d 49, 5961 (2d Cir. 2004); Schuetz v. Banc One Mortgage Corp., 292 F.3d 1004, 1011-12 (9th
Cir. 2002).
186
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 227; see also Levin, supra
note 152, at 794 (criticizing Mead for its inconsistency with the policy reasons for
Chevron, including the agency’s expertise, political accountability, and capacity to
maintain national uniformity of a program).
187
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 230-31.
188
Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 204; see also United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 258 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that Chevron
deference should turn on whether the agency’s decision was authoritative); Christensen
v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589-90 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
189
Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 234.
190
Id. at 234-57. They reason that the majority in Mead could have reached
the same result based on the extreme decentralization of the decision making in the
case. See id. at 257-58.
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officer to whom the agency’s organic statute has granted
authority over a given administrative action—must do in order
for her decision to get Chevron deference.191 The agency’s decision
must bear the delegatee’s name, the delegatee must give a
meaningful review to the decision, and she must adopt the
decision as her own prior to the final issuance of the decision.192
Barron and Kagan argue, “by offering an incentive to certain
actors to take responsibility for interpretive choice, the principle
advances both accountability and discipline in decision
making.”193 A standard that conditions Chevron deference on the
decision-making structure, but more particularly, the
involvement of high-level agency officials in the decision making,
“will encourage high-level officials to assume full and visible
responsibility for interpretive rulings, while ensuring that
meaningful review lies behind these public acclamations.”194
The differing views within scholarship and case law
suggest significant uncertainty in this area of administrative
law. However, one certain point is that the level of deference an
agency action receives can be crucial to whether it survives a
legal challenge. What type of deference should courts apply
when reviewing the Attorney General’s decision in SilvaTrevino? The next section explores this question.
III.

EXAMINING SILVA-TREVINO AT CHEVRON STEP ZERO

When considering whether Silva-Trevino deserves
Chevron deference, courts first must consider the question at
Chevron step zero—the question of whether the Chevron
framework applies at all.195 In this section, I examine the
Attorney General’s decision in Silva-Trevino under Mead. I
focus on the importance of procedures to the Mead holding. I
argue that Silva-Trevino should not command Chevron
deference because, though Congress provided the DOJ with
authority to use relatively formal procedures,196 the agency chose
191

Id. at 237-40.
Id.
193
Id. at 204.
194
Id. at 256.
195
See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 191.
196
See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(2) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall establish
such regulations, prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other papers, issue
such instructions, review such administrative determinations in immigration
proceedings, delegate such authority, and perform such other acts as the Attorney
General determines to be necessary for carrying out this section.”).
192
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the least participatory form of policy making. In addition, I
examine how the agency’s choice of adjudication over rule
making to announce the new moral turpitude test impacts the
Chevron step zero question. Finally, I explore whether the SilvaTrevino decision’s binding effect and authoritativeness will lead
courts to conclude that the Chevron framework applies.
A.

The Secretive Process: Fostering Neither Fairness Nor
Deliberation

Was the Attorney General’s decision in Silva-Trevino an
administrative procedure that “foster[s] the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such
force”197 as required by the court in Mead for an agency action to
merit Chevron deference? As stated recently by the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he unusual circumstances of SilvaTrevino’s referral to, and adjudication by, the Attorney General
bear mention.”198 Silva-Trevino was the result of a secret
process in which the Attorney General certified the decision to
himself without indicating to the parties or any interested
groups that he was considering overhauling the categorical
approach.199 The Attorney General altered over a century of
immigration law without input from members of the public or
the affected party himself.
In deciding Silva-Trevino, the agency did not employ the
tools at its disposal, i.e., formal procedures, “that provide
surrogate safeguards for the protections in the Constitution.”200
The Attorney General made a pronouncement of great force201
197

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 470 n.11 (3d Cir. 2009).
199
See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text. The regulation at 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(h)-(i) gives the Attorney General authority to review any decision by the BIA.
One issue, which is outside of the scope of this article, is whether the regulation
permitting the AG to certify BIA decisions to himself is ultra vires. The provision at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A) states that removal orders become final upon affirmation by the
BIA or expiration of the period in which the respondent may seek review. The
regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(i), which predated section 1101(a)(47)(A), gives
authority to the Attorney General to alter the BIA’s decision, notwithstanding the
statute’s directive that such a BIA decision should be final. Thus, the regulation is
inconsistent with the statute and thus is arguably invalid. See William v. Gonzales,
499 F.3d 329, 334 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that a regulation that prohibits the filing of
a motion to reopen from outside the U.S. is inconsistent with the statute, which allows
one motion to reopen, and therefore the regulation lacks authority and is invalid).
200
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 225.
201
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001); see also In re
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (AG 2008) (“The Board of Immigration Appeals
and the Federal courts have long struggled in administering and applying the Act’s
198
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through a process that did not embody important constitutional
requirements for law making, namely, transparency and
careful consideration.202 No member of the public had any idea
that the agency was considering a complete overhaul of the
categorical approach before the decision was published.203 Any
deliberation that occurred behind the scenes of the Attorney
General’s decision likely was one-sided, as opponents of the
new policy were not given a voice in the discussion.204 This type
of deliberation hardly exudes transparency, since the
discussion took place behind closed doors.205 Lacking
transparency, the decision-making process in Silva-Trevino did
not allow affected parties to detect improper motives by
government actors and assign blame.206 Therefore, the Attorney
General’s decision was not “subject to the political control and
public scrutiny we demand for agencies as compensation for
their lack of direct accountability.”207
Which affected parties did the Attorney General exclude
from the decision-making process, and what considerations
would they have brought to the table? First, the Attorney
General did not seek input from his own immigration judges on
how this decision would impact their workload. The categorical
approach developed in immigration law largely out of a desire

moral turpitude provisions . . . . My review of this case presents an opportunity to
establish a uniform framework for ensuring that the Act’s moral turpitude provisions
are fairly and accurately applied.”).
202
See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 180, at 1373; Bressman, How
Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1479.
203
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 7.
204
See id. at 4-6.
205
In Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the D.C. Circuit
reasoned that an agency’s reliance on ex parte communications after a notice of
rulemaking in informal rulemaking was improper because (1) a court cannot assess the
truth of the agency’s assertions if the knowledge was gained without the benefit of the
adversarial process and (2) a court must assess whether the agency’s rule is sufficient
based on the whole record; ex parte communication leaves out a piece of this record. Id.
at 55-57; see also id. at 56 (“Equally important is the inconsistency of secrecy with
fundamental notions of fairness implicit in due process and with the ideal of reasoned
decisionmaking on the merits which undergirds all of our administrative law.”); but see
Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (refusing to interpret the APA to
mandate disclosures that the statute did not clearly require and discussing the benefits
of informal communications to agencies). Professor Bressman writes that from a
positive political theory standpoint, ex parte communications are problematic, “not so
much because they imperil basic fairness or allow political compromise to guide agency
decisions . . . [r]ather, they are problematic because they deprive outsiders of access to
information about agency action.” Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at
1787.
206
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 506.
207
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1479.
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for administrative efficiency.208 In fiscal year 2009, the fifty-five
immigration courts in the United States received 391,829 cases
to hear and completed 352,233 such cases;209 these numbers
indicate that each judge completed an average of 1500 cases.210
Given the high volume of cases, the categorical approach
ensures a more efficient removal hearing.211
208

See In re Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 335 (B.I.A. 1996). However,
one circuit court judge, writing in 1971, opined about the introduction of the categorical
approach into immigration law:
At the time the rule was first expounded, it is probable that many, if not
most, federal administrative agencies were deemed by courts to be incapable
of deciding such complex questions as when an act “involved moral turpitude”
from the standpoint both of expertise and of proper role. Administrative law
has evolved considerably since that time. In contemporary government we
are quite prepared to delegate innumerable complicated and subtle questions
like this one to administrative agencies. To the extent that the rule was
developed because of a then-justified fear of administrative incapacity, an
extent which is not revealed by the decisions, it should long since have lost its
force.
Marciano v. INS, 450 F.2d 1022, 1027 n.3 (8th Cir. 1971) (Eisele, J., dissenting).
209
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2009
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B1-B2, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy09syb.pdf.
In fiscal year 2010, the now fifty-seven immigration courts in the United States received
392,888 cases to hear and completed 353,247 cases. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK B1-B2 [hereinafter EOIR
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK], available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf.
210
The Honorable Dana Leigh Marks, President of the National Association of
Immigration Judges (NAIJ), recently stated:
[W]hile the average Federal district judge has a pending caseload of 400
cases and three law clerks to assist, in Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2009, immigration
judges completed over 1500 cases per judge on average, with a ratio of one
law clerk for every four judges. Under these circumstances, it is not
surprising that a recent study found immigration judges suffered greater
stress and burnout than prison wardens or doctors in busy hospitals.
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security,
and International Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (June 17, 2010) (Written
statement of Hon. Dana Leigh Marks, President, NAIJ), available at http://judiciary.
house.gov/hearings/pdf/Marks100617.pdf (citing Stuart L. Lustig et al., Burnout and
Stress Among United States Immigration Judges, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 2 (2008);
Stuart L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers: Narrative Responses from the
National Association of Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 57 (2008)). The General Accounting Office in 2006 noted the need for
immigration judges to better control their caseload. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD
PERFORMANCE
REPORTING
NEEDS
IMPROVEMENT
(2006),
available
at
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-771.
211
See Letter from Carolyn B. Lamm, President, ABA, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y
Gen., 2 (Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter ABA Letter], available at http://www.abanet.org/
poladv/letters/immigration/2010jan26_silvatrevino_l.pdf
(“The
categorical
approach
streamlines the complex immigration system by providing immigration adjudicators with a
mechanism to determine the consequences of a criminal conviction by reference only to the
criminal statute and, in some cases, the criminal court record of conviction.”); see also DulalWhiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 132 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated by
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In response to Silva-Trevino, the National Association of
Immigration Judges issued a statement on the decision’s
impact on the immigration courts.212 The judges wrote, “[i]n a
court system that has been widely recognized as overburdened
and lacking sufficient resources, the heightened level of inquiry
mandated by Silva-Trevino has the potential to cause an
inordinate amount of additional work for immigration
judges.”213 The judges were concerned that the decision
“implicates complicated legal arguments in such cases and
creates the prospect of a significant amount of additional
hearing time to resolve the factual and legal issues it
creates . . . .”214 The Attorney General mentioned administrative
efficiency in his decision,215 yet he provided no solution for
immigration judges to control their dockets; the decision
merely made the empty promise that the new approach was
“not an invitation to relitigate the conviction itself.”216
Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (“We have emphasized that the BIA and
reviewing courts are ill-suited to readjudicate the basis of prior criminal convictions . . . . It
was this very concern about collateral trials, and the oppressive administrative burden they
impose, that led the BIA to adopt (and us to endorse) the categorical approach to
removability in the first instance.”). In 1996, the BIA summarized the administrative
efficiency arguments for using the categorical approach:
[T]he principle of not looking behind a record of conviction provides this
Board with the only workable approach in cases where deportability is
premised on the existence of a conviction. If we were to allow evidence that is
not part of the record of conviction as proof [of deportability], we essentially
would be inviting the parties to present any and all evidence bearing on an
alien’s conduct leading to the conviction, including possibly the arresting
officer’s testimony or even the testimony of eyewitnesses who may have been
at the scene of the crime. Such an endeavor is inconsistent both with the
streamlined adjudication that a deportation hearing is intended to provide
and with the settled proposition that an Immigration Judge cannot
adjudicate guilt or innocence.
Pichardo-Sufren, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 335.
212
Statement, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, Impact of Silva-Trevino on the
Immigration Courts, (Apr. 1, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter NAIJ Statement].
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 702 (AG 2008).
216
Id. at 703. The Attorney General, in a footnote, cited some examples of how
judges would apply his new approach. See id. at 703 n.3. However, these examples
merely reiterate the categorical approach; the Attorney General did not explain what
evidence a judge may consider to determine whether an offense involves moral
turpitude if the statute is divisible and the record of conviction is not clear. The
Attorney General did not discuss, for example, whether a judge should accept a
hearsay document (such as a police report) proving that a respondent’s offense involves
moral turpitude. While the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply and thus hearsay is
not per se barred from immigration court, evidence submitted in removal hearings
must be probative and its use must be fundamentally fair. See Bustos-Torres v. INS,
898 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Barcenas, 19 I. & N. Dec. 609, 611 (B.I.A.
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Presumably, the Attorney General would concern himself with
the workload of immigration judges, as they are DOJ
employees, yet their concerns were not heard or considered
before the publication of Silva-Trevino.
The Attorney General also failed to seek input from
immigrants’ rights organizations, who could have foreseen the
myriad of problems stemming from the abandonment of the
categorical approach, which inevitably leads to the re-litigation
of past crimes.217 How would detained, pro se respondents in
removal proceedings218 relitigate criminal cases when they are
often detained far from where their convictions take place?219
How would any respondent relitigate these cases without the
formal rules of evidence,220 Sixth Amendment right to a trial by

1988). In many cases, using a hearsay document such as a police report would be
fundamentally unfair to prove removability. See, e.g., Yongo v. INS, 355 F.3d 27, 31
(1st Cir. 2004) (reasoning that “[h]ighly unreliable hearsay might raise due process
problems”). Additionally, if an immigration judge allows a hearsay document into
evidence to prove the nature of the crime, the judge also should allow the noncitizen to
present testimony or other evidence on the nature of the crime in order to protect the
noncitizen’s right to present evidence on his own behalf. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)
(2006). Thus, the only way to circumvent a violation of a respondent’s due process and
statutory rights is to engage in what may amount to a retrial of the criminal case in
immigration court, which the Attorney General claimed would not happen as a result
of his decision in Silva-Trevino. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 703.
217
See supra note 216.
218
Respondents often are pro se, since persons in removal proceedings do not
have the right to a court-appointed attorney. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A). In addition,
many respondents who face removal for a criminal conviction are subject to mandatory
detention because of their criminal offenses, which makes it difficult for them to get pro
bono assistance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (1996); see also EOIR STATISTICAL YEARBOOK,
supra note 209, at G1 (showing that in fiscal year 2010, 164,742 respondents—fiftyseven percent of the total number of cases heard by immigration courts—appeared pro
se in removal proceedings). These factors are exacerbated due to the shorter case
calendar for these cases, which gives a detainee even less time to prepare defenses to
removal. See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.1(e)
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm
(noting that proceedings for detained noncitizens are expedited).
219
See ABA Letter, supra note 211, at 2 (citing Huge Increase in Transfers of
ICE Detainees, Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (Dec. 2, 2009), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/220; Dep’t of Homeland Security, Office of the
Inspector General, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Policies and Procedures
Related to Detainee Transfers (Dec. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/
assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-13_Nov09.pdf); see also Letter to Eric H. Holder, Att’y Gen.,
from the American Immigration Law Foundation (AILF), et al. In re Silva-Trevino, at 2
(Mar. 3, 2009) [hereinafter AILF Letter], available at http://www.ailf.org/lac/
SignOnLettertoHolder-3-3-09.pdf.
220
See Baliza v. INS, 709 F.2d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 1983) (“Administrative
proceedings are not, however, bound by strict rules of evidence.”); In re Rina, 15 I. & N.
Dec. 453, 455 (B.I.A. 1975) (“[The Federal Rules of Evidence], of course, have no
binding effect in administrative deportation proceedings.”).
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jury,221 Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,222 and Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination?223 How would
respondents relitigate cases that are decades old, yet now form
the basis of removal, when witnesses are unavailable,
memories have faded, documents have been misplaced and
evidence is stale?224
There are other problems arising from Silva-Trevino
that immigrants’ rights groups could have raised during the
decision-making process. For example, would the decision have
a retroactive effect on noncitizens who accepted guilty pleas in
reliance on the categorical approach?225 Would the decision
wreak havoc on the criminal justice system, since many
noncitizens would no longer accept guilty pleas without the
predictability of the categorical approach?226 Several of these
221

See Dulal-Whiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 132 (2d Cir.
2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009) (“[I]t goes without saying
that there is no Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of removability.”).
222
The Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that the exclusionary rule may
only apply in immigration proceedings if there has been an egregious violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984).
223
See In re R, 4 I. & N. Dec. 720, 721 (B.I.A. 1952) (“The fifth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States protects a witness testifying in deportation
proceedings from giving evidence which would tend to show his guilt under a Federal
criminal statute. Where there is no such showing, an alien may be compelled to testify.”).
224
See ABA Letter, supra note 211; AILF Letter, supra note 219, at 2. Since
there is no statute of limitations on most criminal grounds of removal, a removal
hearing can be based on a conviction where the events in question occurred years ago.
See, e.g., In re Lettman, 22 I. & N. Dec. 365, 366 (B.I.A. 1998) (holding that a
noncitizen convicted of an aggravated felony is subject to deportation, regardless of the
date of the conviction, when the alien is placed in deportation proceedings on or after
March 1, 1991 and the crime falls within the aggravated felony definition).
225
See Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60
n.12 (1984) (“[A]n administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when
to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests.”); Chenery II, 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947) (holding that an agency may give retroactive force to a new rule
created through administrative action, but “the retroactivity must be balanced against
the mischief of producing a result which is contrary to a statutory design or to legal
and equitable principles”); Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 950-53 (9th Cir.
2007) (holding that the BIA’s new rule, announced in an adjudication, that drug
trafficking crimes are per se “particularly serious crimes” that bar an applicant from
protection under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) was impermissibly applied retroactively to the
respondent); see also Retail Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 391
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (establishing five-factor balancing test for determining whether an
agency impermissibly applied an adjudicatory decision to a party).
226
This question is of considerable importance in light of the Supreme Court’s
2010 decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), in which the Court held
that it was ineffective assistance of counsel for a defense attorney to fail to advise a
noncitizen about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. See id. at 1482-83; see
also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 n.50 (2001) (reasoning that “competent defense
counsel, following the advice of numerous practice guides,” would advise a noncitizen
about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea). The categorical approach allows
attorneys to more accurately predict the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. See
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issues could have been more thoroughly explored if, prior to the
publication of Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General had reached
out to groups such as immigrants’ rights organizations,227 the
American Bar Association,228 or his own immigration judges.229
Had the agency used formal procedures, it could have
guaranteed “the fairness and deliberation that should underlie
a pronouncement of such force”230 by “giving people an
opportunity to be heard and offering reasoned responses to
what people have to say.”231
The Silva-Trevino decision-making process highlights
Professor Bressman’s argument that procedures perform an
important role in Congressional oversight of agencies, which is
why the Supreme Court placed such value on procedures in
Mead.232 Congress monitors immigration agencies through “fire
alarm” oversight;233 it relies on private parties to gather
information and notify Congress of proposed changes to
regulatory practice.234 Administrative procedures allow
constituents a role in the agency’s decision-making process, so
that constituents can alert Congress to changes long before the
agency irreversibly alters the status quo.235 In the Silva-Trevino
decision-making process, immigrants’ rights organizations, the
ABA and immigration judges could have alerted Congress that
the agency was considering an overhaul of the categorical
approach.236 In light of the cost and due process concerns raised,
ABA Letter, supra note 211, at 3 (“[Under Silva-Trevino,] defense attorneys are unable
to reliably predict the immigration consequences of contemplated dispositions. The
resulting uncertainty will make fewer immigrant defendants willing to enter into plea
agreements, thereby increasing the number of trials and imposing a substantial new
burden on the criminal justice system as a whole.”). Circuit courts have reasoned that
the categorical approach jurisprudence in immigration law “has provided
predictability, enabling aliens to better understand the immigration consequences of a
particular conviction.” Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582 F.3d 462, 482 (3d Cir.
2009); see also Nicanor-Romero v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 992, 1004 (9th Cir. 2008).
227
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66; see also AILF Letter, supra note 219.
228
See ABA Letter, supra note 211 (urging Attorney General Holder to
withdraw Attorney General Mukasey’s decision in Silva-Trevino); AM. BAR. ASS’N
RESOLUTION 113: PRESERVING THE CATEGORICAL APPROACH IN IMMIGRATION
ADJUDICATIONS (Aug. 4, 2009) [hereinafter ABA RESOLUTION].
229
See NAIJ Statement, supra note 212.
230
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
231
See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 225.
232
See Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, supra note 96, at 570.
233
Id. (citing McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 157, at 166).
234
Id.
235
See id.
236
See AILF Letter, supra note 219; ABA Letter, supra note 211; ABA RESOLUTION,
supra note 228; NAIJ Statement, supra note 212; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66.
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Congress may have decided to entrench the categorical
approach by amending the INA.237 Yet these groups did not
have the opportunity to comment until after the decision was a
fait accompli.238 Even a mere notice to Mr. Silva-Trevino about
the issues that the Attorney General would consider, or a
request for amicus briefing on the issue, would have allowed
requisite political participation to ensure adequate
Congressional oversight.239
The Silva-Trevino decision-making process also
highlights scholars’ argument that courts should take cues
from the agency by the procedures it uses and provide
deference accordingly.240 Professor Stephenson, explaining
Mead’s rationale, states: “[C]ourts tend to view formal process
as a proxy for variables that the court considers important but
cannot observe directly, such as the significance of the issue to
the agency’s mission or the degree to which the agency’s
judgment reflects a sensible balancing of the relevant
considerations.”241 Thus, agencies that want to advocate a more
aggressive reading of a statute “must decide whether it is
worth paying the costs associated with formal procedures in
order to ‘purchase’ greater judicial toleration of a more
aggressive interpretation of the statute.”242 The Attorney
General in Silva-Trevino advocated for an aggressive
interpretation of the statute, one that changed years of case
law.243 Yet the agency, by using such paltry procedures, gave the
signal to courts that the new moral turpitude test is of limited
importance, and certainly not important enough to spend money
writing regulations or even asking for outside input in an
adjudication.244 Thus courts should provide a check on the
agency’s actions in Silva-Trevino; because the agency acted
expeditiously and informally, courts should not confer Chevron
237

See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 30-33.
See id. at 7-11.
239
See Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at 1785. In other
important immigration decisions, the BIA has requested briefing from immigrants’
rights organizations. See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 8-9 (citing In re
Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (Att’y Gen. 1997), and In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N.
Dec. 262 (Att’y Gen. 1990), as examples of cases in which prior attorneys general
sought input from the public in the form of amicus briefs).
240
See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 105, at 547-48; Sunstein, Chevron Step
Zero, supra note 5, at 225-26.
241
Stephenson, supra note 105, at 530-31.
242
Id. at 531.
243
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690, 696-704 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
244
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 7-11.
238
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deference.245 Had the agency followed formal procedures, these
procedures would have provided their own checks on the agency
action, so courts could more easily defer to the decision.246
B.

The Choice of Adjudication over Rulemaking

In Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General chose to
overhaul the categorical approach through adjudication instead
of notice-and-comment rulemaking. Adjudication has its
advantages in that it is more efficient and less costly to the
agency; the agency also can frame the issues more narrowly in
an adjudication.247 The Supreme Court has held that the agency
has wide discretion to choose between rulemaking and
adjudication.248 However, courts need not give Chevron
deference to the end product of that choice of policy-making
form;249 rather, Mead announced a rule that “structures scopeof-review doctrine systematically by telling all agencies that
there is a link between the policymaking form chosen and the
standard of review applied.”250
There are good reasons for a reviewing court to decide,
in the case of Silva-Trevino, that “the choice of adjudication
over rulemaking for making policy [was] significant if not
suspect.”251 First, the categorical approach that the Attorney
245

See Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 225-26.
See id.
247
See Magill, supra note 103, at 1397.
248
See Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). The Court also has held that
adjudications should command Chevron deference in the same manner that
rulemaking commands deference. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999).
249
See Magill, supra note 103, at 1425 (“An agency can choose its form . . . but
it does not choose what follows from that choice. What follows—the process the agency
must follow; the legal effect of its action; and whether, when, and under what standard
the action can be challenged in court—are fixed by other sources of law.”); see also id.
at 1405 (explaining the Chenery II principle, which is an “otherwise puzzling judicial
reaction to agency choice of procedure” by arguing that “because the judiciary has
indirect opportunities to shape the consequences of an agency’s choice of form, it need
not directly evaluate the choice of form in any given case”).
250
Id. at 1431.
251
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 536. Professor
Bressman discusses the Chenery II decision, in which the Court stated that agencies
have broad discretion to choose procedures; however, she notes that Chenery II was
decided in 1947, when agencies hardly used rulemaking. Today, she argues, “agencies
now routinely use rulemaking, which makes the choice of adjudication over rulemaking
for making policy significant if not suspect.” Id. at 535-36; see also id. at 537
(“Mead . . . begins a partial weaning from Chenery II and unlimited choice of
procedures. As such, it shows that administrative law has begun to record a concern for
arbitrariness in this area.”); Magill, supra note 103, at 1384-85 (“In the 1950s and
1960s, most administrative agencies implemented their statutes by deciding individual
246
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General upended was well-entrenched; noncitizens had relied
substantially and in good faith on the previous interpretation,
which had existed for over a century.252 Also, the new policy
announced in Silva-Trevino is not context-specific or so
specialized that it is impossible to capture in a rule.253 Rather, the
agency wished to create a new framework for deciding all moral
turpitude cases, not just cases with facts similar to Mr. SilvaTrevino’s.254 When, as in Silva-Trevino, the agency is considering a
ruling that is both well-entrenched and not context-specific, it is
preferable to make policy by rulemaking, “rather than by picking
a sacrificial lamb and making policy through adjudication.”255
The Attorney General chose adjudication to announce the
overhaul of the categorical approach, but did he respect the
elements of the form of policy making he chose?256 The APA does
not govern removal proceedings;257 therefore, the adjudication in
Silva-Trevino does not fall squarely into the box of a “formal” or
“informal” adjudication.258 However, it clearly was an adjudication
affecting liberty interests and therefore must comply with the
requirements of due process.259 Consistent with the notions of due
process, parties should be given notice of the potential change in
law and allowed to brief the issues; the adversarial system allows
both parties to present arguments to a neutral adjudicator and
contest their opponents’ arguments.260 The agency must respond to

cases; by the 1970s, a detectable shift had occurred and most administrative agencies
pursued their mandates by promulgating legislative rules.”).
252
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); Pfaff v. United
States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev., 88 F.3d 739, 748 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Adjudication is best suited for incremental developments to the law, rather than
great leaps forward.”); Magill, supra note 103, at 1424.
253
See Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294; Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202-03; Magill,
supra note 103, at 1424.
254
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 (Att’y Gen. 2008) (“[T]his
opinion establishes an administrative framework for determining whether an alien has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.”).
255
Magill, supra note 103, at 1424.
256
See id. at 1410-11 (“[A]n agency is generally free to choose among all of its
available policymaking forms and, as long as the agency respects the elements of the form
it has chosen, its choice of preferred form will not be directly evaluated by courts.”).
257
See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1954) (reasoning that the
legislative history of the INA indicates a desire by Congress to incorporate some, but
not all, of the procedural protections of the APA into the INA).
258
See supra note 109 for a description of the procedural differences between
formal and informal adjudications.
259
See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972); Yamataya v.
Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
260
See, e.g., Chike v. INS, 948 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1991) (due process violation
found when pro se respondent in deportation hearing was not given notice of the BIA’s
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each argument in order to pass judicial scrutiny under the
reasoned decision-making requirement.261 Thus, in adjudications,
“public input is ensured, and the agency has a substantial
incentive to be responsive to that input.”262 While public input is
not guaranteed in the same manner as in notice-and-comment
rulemaking,263 stakeholders often have opportunity for input
through amicus briefs, either requested by the agency264 or by a
party to the adjudication.265
briefing schedule and the government was allowed to file a brief); Reconsideration
Memo, supra note 66, at 7-8.
261
The “reasoned decision-making requirement” or “hard look doctrine,”
requires the agency to explain its reasons enough to determine whether its decision
was arbitrary and capricious. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 407-08, 420 (1971) (remanding a decision to approve construction of a
highway through a park because the agency did not state the reasons for choosing that
particular route; holding that the agency must offer “some explanation” to allow the
court to determine whether “the [agency] acted within . . . [its] authority and if the
[agency’s] action was justifiable under the applicable standard”); see also Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (applying the
reasoned decision-making requirement to notice-and-comment rulemaking and
defining an agency decision that was arbitrary and capricious as one that (1) relied on
factors Congress did not intend it to consider, (2) entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, (3) offered an explanation for decision making that
runs counter to evidence before the agency, or (4) was so implausible that it cannot be
ascribed to a difference in view or product of agency expertise); Bressman, Beyond
Accountability, supra note 107, at 476 (discussing that the passage of the APA in 1946
allowed judges to seize on the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review contained
therein and require agencies to produce a record reflecting consideration of all relevant
issues to facilitate judicial review). Because the agency’s decision must not be arbitrary
and capricious, the agency must anticipate problems with its reasoning. Scholars argue
that the best way to anticipate such problems is to open up the process to challengers
before the decision is final; formal procedures facilitate this crucial input from the
public. See, e.g., Bressman, Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at 1781.
262
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 885.
263
See id. at 886 (“At a minimum, at least one interested party will exist to
act as the virtual representative of other similarly situated persons.”).
264
For example, in Wyman-Gordon, the Supreme Court discussed how the
NLRB had “invited certain interested parties” to file briefs and participate in oral
arguments prior to its ruling in Excelsior Underwear, Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), which set forth a new policy requiring employers to
provide unions with lists of names of employees before elections. See NLRB v. WymanGordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 762-63 (1969) (plurality opinion) (quoting Excelsior
Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1238); see also Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 89 (citing In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262 (B.I.A. 1990), and In re Soriano,
21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996), as examples of cases in which prior attorneys general
sought input from the public in the form of amicus briefs).
265
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 5, at 886. Professor Magill writes:
As courts encouraged and embraced notice-and-comment rulemaking as a
policymaking tool, the exclusion of parties from adjudication began to look
anachronistic. Instead of requiring agencies to rely on rulemaking under
certain circumstances, the courts recognized participation rights for parties
who were interested in (but were not the objects of) adjudications and thus
made some adjudications look a little bit more like rulemaking.
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Silva-Trevino is an example of adjudication in its least
participatory form. The basic requirements for due process
were not met. Mr. Silva-Trevino was given no notice of the
potential change in law;266 moreover, it is highly likely that Mr.
Silva-Trevino’s opponents, in ex parte communications with the
office of the Attorney General,267 were allowed to make their
case without an opposing party present.268 The Attorney
General did not ask for any briefing from interested
stakeholders; nor could Mr. Silva-Trevino ask for amici to
weigh in because he did not know that the Attorney General
was considering a major overhaul of the categorical approach
until after the publication of the decision.269 Adjudication at its
best can be closer to the deliberation that occurs in notice-andcomment rulemaking.270 Adjudication at its worst, i.e., SilvaTrevino, should command less deference from courts because of
Magill, supra note 103, at 1440.
266
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 7.
267
Id. at 9 (“[I]t appears highly likely that the certification process in this case
began with some ex parte communication with the Attorney General.”); see also id. at
10 (“[T]here is a troubling possibility that the certification process in this case may
have been used by the Office of Immigration Litigation to shore up its litigation
positions in court.”).
268
In immigration cases, the APA’s strict prohibition on ex parte
communication in adjudications does not apply because the APA does not apply to
removal proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d) (2006); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S.
302, 310 (1954). However, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment guarantees a
neutral judge. See Vasha v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 863, 872 (6th Cir. 2005). In a challenge
to the use of ex parte communications in the immigration context, the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania stated:
The decisions of EOIR adjudicators are entitled to a “presumption of
regularity,” and a party alleging irregularity bears the burden of proving
it . . . . Consequently, in order to warrant a hearing on their claim of political
interference and ex parte communications, Petitioners must make a “strong
showing” of impropriety by administrative officials.
Yang v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 320, 331 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (citing McLeod v. INS, 802 F.2d
89, 95 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 420 (1971)).
In Sierra Club, Judge Patricia Wald reasoned that ex parte
communications are permissible in rulemaking because “[o]ur form of government
simply could not function efficiently or rationally if key executive policymakers were
isolated from each other and from the Chief Executive.” Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d
298, 406 (D.C. Cir. 1981). However, Judge Wald reasoned that one instance where it is
necessary to reveal ex parte communications is when “such conversations directly
concern the outcome of adjudications or quasi-adjudicatory proceedings” because “there
is no inherent executive power to control the rights on individuals in such settings.” Id.
at 407.
269
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 6.
270
See Magill, supra note 103, at 1440; see also id. at 1397 (noting that there
is often a more extensive vetting of views if the agency presents its view to an
administrative tribunal).
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the due process violations to the individual and the lack of
deliberation by the agency.271
It would go too far to suggest that the Silva-Trevino
decision only merits Chevron deference if the agency followed
the strict requirements of notice-and-comment rulemaking.272 In
Mead, the Court did not require agencies to use the most
formal procedures to command Chevron deference;273 standard
procedures such as notice-and-comment rulemaking and
adjudication are mere examples of the types of procedures that
are acceptable to guarantee Chevron deference.274 Professor
Bressman states, “[U]nmitigated formalism is neither
necessary or wise . . . . We instead should afford Congress or
agencies a little leeway to create administrative law-making
procedures beyond trial-type or paper hearings.”275 However,
courts should “require that those procedures adhere to certain
specified limits—in particular, that the resulting policy is
transparent, rational, and binding.”276 As the decision-making
process in Silva-Trevino was neither transparent, nor its results
rational, the decision should not merit Chevron deference.
C.

Can Silva-Trevino Survive Step Zero?

It could be argued that a court reviewing Silva-Trevino
would have adequate reasons to decide that the decision passes
Chevron step zero. The decision had binding effect on future
271

In Alaska Dep’t of Health & Social Servs. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs., 424 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit examined an agency’s
adjudication under Mead and conferred Chevron deference to the decision because of
the multiple opportunities for participation by the parties and deliberation by the
agency. Id. at 939. The court stated:
Here, the formal administrative process afforded the State included the
opportunities to petition for reconsideration, brief its arguments, be heard at
a formal hearing, receive reasoned decisions at multiple levels of review, and
submit exceptions to those decisions. These hallmarks of “fairness and
deliberation” are clear evidence that Congress intended the Administrator’s
final determination to “carry[] the force of law.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (alteration in original)).
272
See Anthony, Agency Interpretations, supra note 84, at 46 (“It is manifestly too
late in the day to suggest that Chevron acceptance should apply only to interpretations
embodied in legislative rules.”); Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 535
(discussing scholars’ praise for notice-and-comment rulemaking to set policy, but observing
“[w]hen push comes to shove, few scholars want to reduce agency flexibility”).
273
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
274
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1450.
275
Id.
276
Id.
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parties, and was made by the agency head. However, both of
these arguments fall short of effectively establishing that the
decision should receive Chevron deference.
First, the Attorney General’s decision in Silva-Trevino
has binding effect on future parties.277 Silva-Trevino was
published and thus precedent-setting,278 making its binding
effect “immediate and irrevocable until officially renounced.”279
The decision’s binding effect distinguishes it from the tariff
ruling letter at issue in Mead, for which the “binding character
as a ruling stop[ped] short of third parties.”280 While other
importers were warned against assuming any right of
detrimental reliance on the tariff ruling letter in Mead,281 any
noncitizen facing CIMT charges is subject to the Attorney
General’s new approach.282
Binding effect is also the “promise of consistent
application.”283 One might question how Silva-Trevino promises
consistent application, due to the decision’s clear inconsistency
with over a century of practice.284 Yet this type of change in
agency position should merit the same level of deference as an
original agency interpretation. The Supreme Court in National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services285 held that “[a]gency inconsistency is not a basis for
declining to analyze the agency’s interpretation under the

277

See, e.g., Levin, supra note 152, at 774-75; see also Garcia-Quintero v.
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales,
449 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In light of Mead, the ‘essential factor’ in determining
whether an agency action warrants Chevron deference is its precedential value.”)).
278
The regulation provides:
By majority vote of the permanent Board members, selected decisions of the
Board rendered by a three-member panel or by the Board en banc may be
designated to serve as precedents in all proceedings involving the same issue
or issues. Selected decisions designated by the Board, decisions of the
Attorney General, and decisions of the Secretary of Homeland Security to the
extent authorized in paragraph (i) of this section, shall serve as precedents in
all proceedings involving the same issue or issues.
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).
279
See Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1488-89.
280
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001).
281
See id. at 233 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 177.9(c)).
282
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (Att’y Gen. 2008); see
generally Tooby & Kesselbrenner, supra note 53.
283
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1488-89.
284
See United States ex rel. Mylius v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914);
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-704.
285
545 U.S. 967 (2005).
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Chevron framework.”286 The Court reasoned, “[I]f the agency
adequately explains the reasons for a reversal of policy, ‘change
is not invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave
the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the
implementing agency.’”287 While the Attorney General
significantly changed immigration law, he explained his
reasons for doing so, anticipating some of his opponents’
arguments and rebutting them in a lengthy decision.288
However, the decision’s binding effect alone should not
be enough to create the “force of law.”289 Merely calling the
decision precedent does not automatically confer Chevron
deference; the Mead Court stated: “[P]recedential value alone
does not add up to Chevron entitlement.”290 Reflecting on this
sentence from the Mead decision, Professor Merrill states,
“This would seem to negate any claim that authority to
articulate a rule of decision is a sufficient condition of power to
act with the force of law.”291
Why is declaring that an agency decision is precedent
insufficient to create the “force of law”? In the context of agency
adjudication, precedential value does not confer the “force of
law” in the same manner as court-made precedential case law.
Professor Richard Murphy has noted, “[t]he law-like quality of
case-law flows from precedential force; one should expect an
interpretation of law adopted in a given case to function as law
in later cases precisely because stare decisis requires courts to
defer to past judicial opinions.”292 As underscored by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brand X, an agency, unlike a
court, can easily alter well-settled precedent, “provided that its
explanation for its departure can survive judicial review for
arbitrariness. Because agency ‘precedents’ do not bind later
agency decision making in any serious way, they do not possess
the same potential as judicial precedents to create generally

286

See id. at 981.
Id. (quoting Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)).
288
See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688-704.
289
See Merrill, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 817.
290
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 232 (2001) (reasoning that
interpretive rules may sometimes function as precedents, but are not accorded Chevron
deference “as a class”).
291
Merrill, Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 817 (emphasis
in original).
292
Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency Commitment, and Force of
Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013, 1042 (2005) [hereinafter Murphy, Judicial Deference].
287
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applicable and binding law.”293 In Silva-Trevino, the Attorney
General suddenly reversed years of case law, invoking Brand X
to remind challengers that agencies can change their minds.294
The ease with which he could make such a change conflicts
with the “rule-of-law idea that regulated parties ought to be
able to identify the law and to expect that it will persist for
some reasonable period of time.”295
Moreover, the decision is binding in name only, as the
Attorney General did not “exercise [his law-making] authority
in ways that generally promote consistency and specifically
prevent ad hoc departures at the behest of narrow interests.”296
Professor Bressman writes, “By announcing a rule that binds
all similarly situated parties, agencies may stem requests for
deviations except through official channels.”297 As noted by the
amici who asked the Attorney General to reconsider his
decision in Silva-Trevino, it appears that the Attorney General
abandoned the traditional categorical approach upon request of
the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) of the DOJ, which
wanted to shore up its litigation positions in court.298 It appears
that OIL was permitted to request a deviation from prior case
293

Id. Professor Murphy argues for a “commitment theory,” under which courts
should give Chevron deference to agency decisions that reflect a longstanding
commitment or those that are difficult for the agency to change in the future (because, for
example, the agency interpretation was promulgated through notice-and-comment
rulemaking, which would require new rulemaking to change). See id. at 1065. Agency
interpretations announced in formal adjudications do not have the promise of consistent
application because they can be amended cheaply by the agency “with little or no
procedural ado.” Id. at 1071. Therefore, Professor Murphy disagrees with the majority in
Mead that formal adjudications should receive Chevron deference. See id. at 1071-72.
294
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
295
Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 292, at 1026; see also Jonathan
Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency Commitments, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 1021, 1040-41 (2007) (arguing that post-Brand X, agencies will have great
difficulty persuading private parties to rely on agency interpretations).
296
Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 539; see also
Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1479-80 (“The
Constitution . . . demands consistent application, as evident in Article I, the Due
Process Clause, and elsewhere. Thus, it requires procedural formalities to promote
predictable and fair lawmaking, not simply accountable lawmaking.”).
297
Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 539.
298
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 10. The agency’s attempt to
look behind the record of conviction already had met some resistance in the circuit
courts; for example, the Second Circuit rejected the BIA’s decision in Gertsenshteyn,
which allowed for a factual inquiry into whether a prostitution aggravated felony
offense was committed for commercial advantage. See Gertsenshteyn v. Mukasey, 544
F.3d 137, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit stated: “[t]hat the Government
finds that task [proving removability through the use of the record of conviction]
difficult in some cases is no reason for immigration courts to renounce the restrictions
that the courts have said the law requires.” Id. at 148.
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law through unofficial channels, namely, ex parte
communication.299 The agency’s sudden, abrupt departure from
over a century of case law seemed to be tailored to the narrow
interests of OIL, without considering the views of the many
others whom the decision impacted.300
Another reason for courts to give deference to SilvaTrevino is because the decision was authoritative: it
“represent[s] the official position of the expert agency.”301 The
decision was rendered by the head of the DOJ,302 thus
distinguishing it from decisions such as the tariff letters in
Mead, which were written by low-level agency officials who did
not have the same authority over agency policy.303 However,
unlike Mead, the Silva-Trevino decision set forth a uniform
policy to alter the behavior of regulated individuals; it was not
one of thousands issued per year by low-level agency officials.304
Not only did the Attorney General have the authority to make
policy, but he clearly intended to exercise this authority to
establish a new framework for determining whether an offense
involves moral turpitude.305 Scholars, including Justice Kagan,
299

See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 10.
See Bressman, Beyond Accountability, supra note 107, at 539; see also
AILF Letter, supra note 219; ABA Letter, supra note 211; ABA RESOLUTION, supra
note 228; NAIJ Statement, supra note 212; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66.
301
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589-90 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
302
In their article Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, Barron and Kagan
illustrate their argument that only authoritative decisions should receive Chevron
deference by using as an example the Attorney General deciding an immigration law
issue. See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 262-63 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526
U.S. 415, 425 (1999)) (recognizing that this argument is inconsistent with AguirreAguirre, in which the Court held that the BIA has power to give meaning to immigration
statutory terms because the Attorney General has vested the BIA with such power).
303
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233-34 (2001).
304
See id. (“Any suggestion that rulings intended to have the force of law are
being churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency’s 46 scattered offices is
simply self-refuting.”). Professor Merrill, interpreting the Mead Court’s force of law
holding, explains that “a delegation to an agency to act with the force of law will
usually generate uniform rules throughout the agency’s jurisdiction.” Merrill, MetaRules and Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 817. He argues that a “regulatory
system unconcerned with whether like cases are treated alike is an unlikely candidate
for the appellation ‘law.’” Id.
305
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 689 (Att’y Gen. 2008) (“This
opinion establishes an administrative framework for determining whether an alien has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.”); cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233 (“It is
difficult, in fact, to see in the agency practice itself any indication that Customs ever
set out with a lawmaking pretense in mind when it undertook to make classifications
like these.”). Professor Koch discusses what he sees as two core questions that the
Mead Court answered: first, did Congress delegate authority to make policy to the
agency, and second, did the agency intend to exercise its policy-making function. See
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Policymaking, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV.
300
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have argued that the authority of the decision maker alone is
sufficient to command Chevron deference;306 their arguments
find support in Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Mead.307
Justice Kagan and Professor Barron argue that courts
should grant Chevron deference only if the head of the agency
made the decision, as this approach promotes “accountability
and discipline in decision making.”308 Silva-Trevino, however, is
a case that disproves this theory. Accountability is not served
by awarding Chevron deference to the head of the agency when
he acts on behalf of an administration that already has been
voted out of office.309 A “midnight adjudication” such as SilvaTrevino presents a great risk of abuse of power by an outgoing
administration;310 the Attorney General purposefully could have
chosen not to commence notice-and-comment rulemaking, which
would have lasted long enough to spill over into the next
administration and allow opposing views to dictate the results.311
As Professor Jack Beerman has stated, “As the end of a term
375, 398 (2002). The Court answered the first question in the affirmative, and the
second in the negative. See id. Unlike the agency in Mead, the Attorney General,
deciding Silva-Trevino, intended to exercise his policy-making function. See SilvaTrevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 688 (Att’y Gen. 2008) (“The Board of Immigration Appeals
and the Federal courts have long struggled in administering and applying the Act’s
moral turpitude provisions . . . . My review of this case presents an opportunity to
establish a uniform framework for ensuring that the Act’s moral turpitude provisions
are fairly and accurately applied.”).
306
See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 229.
307
See Mead, 533 U.S. at 258 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Christensen v.
Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 589-90 n.* (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment).
308
Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 204.
309
See Nina Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and
Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 566-67 (2003).
Professor Mendelson reasons that rulemaking occurring late in an administration can
promote accountability because the electorate can participate in the notice-andcomment rulemaking process. See id. at 636. She argues that such “midnight
rulemaking” raises the issue’s visibility, which arguably creates more public debate
than the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking process, in which primarily wellorganized interest groups participate. See id. at 635-36. She argues, however, that
“[o]ther forms of policy entrenchment may lack significant potential to create dialogue,
and, moreover, because of their lack of procedural discipline and their narrow focus,
coupled with the lack of electoral accountability, they may present a greater risk of
abuse.” Id. at 658.
310
See id. (reasoning that a great risk of abuse of power is presented when
outgoing administrations do not use formal procedures, since the lack of electoral
accountability is coupled with the lack of dialogue on the new policy).
311
See Masur, supra note 295, at 1069 (discussing why outgoing
administrations do not have time to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking between
the election results and the new administration, which is why “the prototypical
‘eleventh hour’ executive actions are those that the President can undertake
unilaterally and instantaneously”).
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nears, the political costs of taking action may decrease, which
may free an administration to take action that it could not have
taken earlier in its term . . . [n]ear the end of a term, political
costs and benefits may be less important to the administration.”312
Thus, Attorney General Mukasey could “assume full and visible
responsibility”313 for the Silva-Trevino ruling; yet he suffered no
repercussions, since he knew at the time of publication that his
days as Attorney General were numbered.314
The Attorney General’s decision also lacked discipline,
as there was insufficient deliberation preceeding SilvaTrevino’s publication.315 As discussed in Part III.A, the Attorney
General concluded that his decision would not lead to the
relitigation of past crimes; this error led him to inadequately
weigh concerns such as administrative efficiency.316 This flaw in
reasoning was not the only error of law contained in the
opinion.317 Perhaps the Attorney General did not have time to
312

Jack M. Beerman, Presidential Power in Transitions, 83 B.U. L. REV. 947,

958 (2003).
313

See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 256.
See Beerman, supra note 312, at 958 (“Near the end of a term, political
costs and benefits may be less important to the administration.”).
315
See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 204.
316
See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
317
For example, the Attorney General discussed a “patchwork” of circuit court
decisions on the use of the categorical approach; in the name of the uniform application
of immigration law, he wished to create one approach to the CIMT analysis with his
decision in Silva-Trevino. See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 694 (Att’y Gen.
2008). Most of the cases cited by the Attorney General demonstrated circuit splits over
when an immigration adjudicator could look at the record of conviction and when a
statute was actually divisible. See Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 474 n.16 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“Although courts employ different labels to describe the categorical and
modified categorical approaches, the fundamental methodology is the same.”). In only
one outlier case, Ali, had a court permitted an adjudicator to look behind the record of
conviction. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an
immigration judge can consider evidence outside of the record of conviction to
determine whether an offense is a crime involving moral turpitude); Silva-Trevino, 24
I. & N. Dec. at 693-94; see also Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 19 n.12
(questioning the validity of the Ali decision because it was a panel decision that
conflicted with prior panel decisions and noting the flaws in the Ali court’s reasoning).
The amici who challenged the Silva-Trevino decision stated:
314

The decisions of federal courts are uniform but for the outlier of the Seventh
Circuit in Ali, which is the only cited decision that invites courts to look
outside the record of conviction to determine if a person has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude. By adopting this outlier as the basis of its:
“uniform” approach, the Attorney General essentially guts the analysis
adopted by the other federal circuits and creates the disuniformity it
purportedly seeks to avoid.
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 13.
In addition, the Attorney General reasoned that “moral turpitude” is never
an element of a noncitizen’s prior offense; while it is “simple” for a sentencing court
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adequately deliberate because the Silva-Trevino decision was
rushed out during the final days of the Bush administration,318
in attempts to entrench the new policy before the opposing
party took office.319 Perhaps the Attorney General’s decision
lacked meaningful review because he did not believe that his
sense of professional responsibility and importance were at
stake if he indiscriminately signed off on the decision.320
Perhaps the decision lacked accuracy and thoroughness due to
the Attorney General’s failure to “invite and consider the
comments of all the world, including those of directly affected
persons who are able, often uniquely, to supply pertinent
information and analysis.”321 Regardless of the cause, the
Attorney
General’s
opinion
in
Silva-Trevino,
while
authoritative, was not disciplined.
Why should courts care about the discipline used by an
agency to make a decision? The leading normative theory for
Chevron deference is that agencies have greater policy
expertise than courts.322 Courts are generalists; agencies are
specialists.323 “Specialists usually have a better grasp of
employing the categorical approach to search for the necessary elements in the statute
of conviction for the prior offense, an immigration court never will find “moral
turpitude” listed in the elements of the statute. Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 70001. However, the Attorney General glossed over the precursor to the immigration judge
conducting the categorical approach: the judge first looks to case law to determine
which elements necessarily involve moral turpitude. See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 47778. Then the judge searches for evidence of those elements in the record of conviction if
the statute is divisible. The judge never looks for the words “moral turpitude” in the
elements of the offense or the record of conviction.
318
Cf. Richard Murphy, The Brand X Constitution, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1247,
1300 (2007) (citing Letter from James Madison to James Monroe, President of the
United States (Dec. 27, 1817), in 3 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON
217, 221 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1867)) (“[A] great deal of legislation does
not receive serious, broad-based scrutiny from members of Congress. James Madison
made this point nearly two hundred years ago, explaining that ‘midnight precedents’—
the result of last-minute, pell-mell rush that attends the close of legislative sessions—
deserves no one’s respect.”).
319
See Beerman, supra note 312, at 956-59 (describing reasons why agencies
may choose to wait until the end of the President’s term to take important
administrative action).
320
See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 252.
321
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 180, at 1373; see also AILF Letter,
supra note 219; ABA Letter, supra note 211; ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 228; NAIJ
Statement, supra note 212; Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66.
322
See, e.g., Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, supra note 5, at 197; Elhauge, supra
note 93, at 2135. Professor Ronald J. Krotoszynski, however, argues that while
Chevron referenced agency expertise as a “background consideration supporting a rule
of deference,” the result was compelled by an implied delegation of law-making power
to the agency. Krotoszynski, supra note 135, at 739.
323
See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE
L.J. 969, 973 (1992) [hereinafter Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent].
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technical terms or the practical consequences of a decision, and
thus their views should be given deference by generalists.”324
Yet agency decisions do not always receive such deference. As
Professor Murphy has explained, “[a]n agency’s comparative
interpretive advantages can only matter where an agency
actually makes use of them—an interpretation that an agency
bases on astrology, for instance, has little claim to anyone’s
respect.”325 Thus, “courts might justifiably engage in
independent review where there are grounds for concluding
that an agency has not done its interpretive ‘homework.’”326 In
the Silva-Trevino decision-making process, the Attorney
General merely putting his name on the decision cannot make
up for the failure to do his “interpretive ‘homework.’”327
Justice Scalia would have liked the Mead majority to
base its decision on the authoritativeness of the decision
maker, yet this was the dissent, not the majority opinion.328 The
majority in Mead emphasized how the agency made its
decision, not who made the decision.329 Of the possible indicators
for whether an agency decision has the “force of law,” the Mead
opinion “suggest[s] that chief among them is the degree of
procedural formality involved in the action.”330 As discussed in this
section, the agency’s decision-making process in Silva-Trevino
was lacking in procedural formalities that would ensure the
“fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement
of such force.”331 Had the Attorney General used formal
procedures, such procedural formality could have guarded against

324

Id.
Id. at 1052.
326
Id. For example, in Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009), the Court
refused Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the statutory term “persecutor of
others,” which precluded a grant of asylum or withholding of removal, because the BIA
had not exercised its interpretive authority, but rather relied on a case interpreting the
term in an entirely different statutory context. See id. at 1166-67. The Court remanded to
the BIA for an initial determination of the statutory term in question.
327
See Murphy, Judicial Deference, supra note 292, at 1052.
328
See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
329
See id. at 230 (majority opinion) (“It is fair to assume generally that
Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for
a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”).
330
Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 210-11; see also Richard Murphy, The
Brand X Constitution, supra note 318, at 1290 (“[A] dominant theme of Mead remains the
Court’s effort to cabin the scope of Chevron deference with procedure.”); Merrill, MetaRules and Meta-Standards, supra note 136, at 814 (“One factor clearly deemed relevant
by the majority is whether the statute ‘provides for a relatively formal procedure.’”).
331
Mead, 533 U.S. at 230.
325
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what amounted to an “‘authoritative’ production of unfair,
inconsistent[,] or arbitrary law.”332
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

This section discusses some different approaches to
solve the problem unleashed by Attorney General Mukasey
when he published the Silva-Trevino decision. Each approach,
however, is not a perfect fix; the proposed solutions and
problems with each solution are discussed below.
A.

Courts Can Refuse Chevron Deference

The primary solution proposed in this article is for
courts to refuse deference to the agency’s decision in SilvaTrevino. Courts would have an opportunity to review this issue
if a noncitizen, ordered removed pursuant to the new moral
turpitude test, challenges his removal order in a circuit court of
appeals.333 Courts can refuse deference under Chevron step zero;
however, this requires wading through the murky waters of
Mead and answering questions that courts may prefer to leave
to law review articles.334 The first circuit court to consider
whether to give Silva-Trevino deference, the Third Circuit in
2009 in Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen.,335 did not consider the impact
of the Attorney General’s procedures, as this challenge was not
raised by the petitioner.336 However, the court reasoned, “the
lack of transparency, coupled with the absence of input by
interested stakeholders, only serves to dissuade us further
from deferring to the Attorney General’s novel approach.”337
A solution of lesser resistance is for courts to refuse to
defer to Silva-Trevino under Chevron step one, by reasoning
that the word “convicted” in the relevant statutes indicates a

332

Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1449.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
334
See, e.g., Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled, supra note 103, at 1446
(“Because courts are insecure about Mead, many grant lower-level Skidmore deference
in addition to or in lieu of Chevron deference. Thus, courts engage in Mead-induced
Chevron avoidance.”); cf. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.,
545 U.S. 967, 1019 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is indeed a wonderful new world
that the Court creates, one full of promises for administrative-law professors in need of
tenure articles and, of course, for litigators.”).
335
582 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2010).
336
See id. at 417 n.11.
337
Id.
333
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clear Congressional preference for the categorical approach.338
This was the Third Circuit’s approach in Jean-Louis; the court
held that the Attorney General’s “novel framework for
determining whether a petitioner has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude”339 should not command Chevron
deference because the statute was clear.340 However, there is
arguably some ambiguity when considering all of the relevant
removal statutes.341 This ambiguity may be sufficient for courts
to move to Chevron step two, under which deference to Silva-

338

See Dulal-Whiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 124-25 (2d
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009); In re VelazquezHerrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008).
339
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 464 (3d Cir. 2009).
340
The Third Circuit in Jean-Louis decided that the Immigration and
Nationality Act was clear and that the ambiguity described by the Attorney General in
Silva-Trevino was “an ambiguity of his own making, not grounded in the text of the
statute, and certainly not grounded in the BIA’s own rulings or the jurisprudence of
courts of appeals going back for over a century.” Id. at 473; see also id. at 477
(reasoning that the Attorney General’s division of the term “‘crime’ and ‘involving
moral turpitude’” into a noun and subordinate clause “distorts its intended meaning”).
The court cited longstanding case law that “the term ‘convicted’ forecloses
individualized inquiry in an alien’s specific conduct and does not permit examination of
extra-record evidence.” Id. at 473-74 (citing Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 513).
The court reasoned, “Congress has prescribed a single definition of ‘convicted,’
applicable to all removable offenses,” so it was inconsistent with the statute to employ
the categorical approach for removable offenses such as aggravated felonies, yet use
the new approach for crimes involving moral turpitude. Id. at 474-75.
341
While Congress stated that only those “convicted” of a crime involving
moral turpitude could be deported, the Immigration and Nationality Act renders
inadmissible a noncitizen “convicted of, or who admits having committed or who admits
committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral
turpitude.” See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii); § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (emphasis
added). For all of these noncitizens attempting to overcome the ground of
inadmissibility for a CIMT, the statutory language includes both convictions and
admission to the essential elements of a CIMT; this language can create enough
ambiguity for courts to give Chevron deference to the Attorney General’s decision in
Silva-Trevino. The amici argued that BIA and federal court decisions concluded that
Congress intended, even when a noncitizen admits to the essential elements of a CIMT,
to prevent judges from trying facts and underlying conduct. See Reconsideration Memo,
supra note 66, at 26 (citing Howes v. Tozer, 3 F.2d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1925); United
States ex rel. Castro v. Williams, 203 F. 155, 156-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)); see also id. at 22
(citing In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (B.I.A. 1980); In re Winter, 12 I. & N. Dec.
638, 642 (B.I.A. 1968)). However, the statutory term “admits” does appear to be
ambiguous, unlike the term “convicted.” Cf. Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 513
(holding that “where a ground of deportability is premised on the existence of a
‘conviction’ for a particular type of crime, the focus of the immigration authorities must
be on the crime of which the alien was convicted, to the exclusion of any other criminal
or morally reprehensible acts he may have committed” (alteration in original)). As such,
the agency can change its mind with respect to its meaning. See Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005). That new
meaning, even if it conflicts with federal circuit court precedent, may command
Chevron deference. See id.
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Trevino is likely, as courts rarely reject an agency’s
interpretation when deciding whether it is permissible.342
B.

Skidmore Review of Silva-Trevino

If Silva-Trevino fails Chevron step zero, as proposed in
this article, courts will analyze the decision under the
Skidmore factors. Many scholars have discussed Skidmore
deference.343 Professor Kristin Hickman and Matthew Krueger
cite two conceptions of the Skidmore test: the independent
judgment model, under which courts substitute their views for
that of the agency;344 and the sliding-scale model, under which
the degree to which courts award deference to an agency’s
decision varies according to the contextual factors suggested by
the Skidmore Court:345 the thoroughness evident in the agency’s
consideration, its consistency with earlier pronouncements, and
any other factors that give it “power to persuade.”346 Apart from
the contextual factors, courts measure the validity of the
agency’s reasoning under the Skidmore sliding-scale model.347
In an empirical study of courts’ decisions during the five years
following Mead, which revived the Skidmore doctrine, Hickman
and Krueger found that courts prefer the sliding-scale model of
Skidmore review.348 Hickman and Krueger also concluded that
342

See Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 323, at
977 (“If [a court] resolves the question [of statutory interpretation] at [Chevron] step
two, then it applies a standard of maximum deference. In effect, Chevron transformed
a regime that allowed courts to give agencies deference along a sliding scale into a
regime with an on/off switch.”); see also Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984) (requiring courts to defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”).
343
See generally Diver, supra note 81; Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D.
Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235
(2007); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 323.
344
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1252-53 (citing Diver, supra
note 81, at 565). Professor Diver comments on the various meanings of deference,
writing that “[a]t one extreme, deference might mean nothing more than ‘respectful or
courteous regard.’” Diver, supra note 81, at 565. Under this meaning of deference,
courts do not give any special weight to an agency’s decision; rather, courts weigh the
agency’s position on an issue as it would any other litigant’s arguments. See id. at 565.
He writes, “[o]f course, the ‘weight’ assigned to any advocate’s position is presumably
dependent upon the ‘thoroughness evident in its consideration’ and the ‘validity of its
reasoning.’” Id. at 565 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
345
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1255-56 (citing 5 KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20:16, at 400 (2d ed. 1984), and Merrill,
Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, supra note 323, at 972).
346
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
347
See id.; Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1273, 1285.
348
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1259-71.
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courts were highly deferential to agencies, notwithstanding
that Skidmore encourages lighter deference than Chevron.349
Does Silva-Trevino withstand Skidmore review? Using
an independent judgment model, courts will regard SilvaTrevino as merely a novel litigation position proposed by the
agency.350 Since Silva-Trevino contradicts well-entrenched case
law,351 courts probably will resort to their own precedent
decisions,352 all of which mandate the traditional categorical
approach.353 Courts also may find that Silva-Trevino, as a
litigation position, is not persuasive because the decision
contains several errors of law, including resting on the faulty
presumption that abandoning the traditional categorical
approach would not lead to a relitigation of past crimes.354
Using a sliding-scale model of Skidmore review, courts will
evaluate contextual factors: the thoroughness evident in the
agency’s
consideration,
its
consistency
with
earlier
pronouncements, and any other factors that give it “power to
persuade.”355 The most prominent contextual factor is consistency:
Silva-Trevino is entirely inconsistent with almost a century of
immigration case law.356 Since 1914, courts and the agency have
349

See id. at 1271.
Cf. Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 464 (3d Cir. 2009) (describing
Silva-Trevino as a “novel framework for determining whether a petitioner has been
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude”).
351
See, e.g., Dulal-Whiteway v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116,
124 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009); In re
Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008); United States ex rel. Mylius
v. Uhl, 210 F. 860, 863 (2d Cir. 1914).
352
Hickman and Krueger cite Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates v. Wells,
538 U.S. 440 (2003), as an example of the independent judgment model of Skidmore
review. See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1254. In Clackamas, the Court
adopted a reading of the statute based on its own precedents interpreting the statute;
that the agency’s approach was consistent with the Court’s own precedents was an
afterthought. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448-51; see also Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615
F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (refusing, without significant discussion, to apply the SilvaTrevino approach because it conflicted with the court’s precedent); Godinez-Arroyo v.
Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 2008) (reasoning that a Board of Immigration
Appeals decision merits Skidmore deference because it is consistent with the Board’s
prior decisions, the court’s published opinions, and opinions of other circuit courts).
353
See, e.g., Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007);
Omari v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2005); Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d
600, 606 (7th Cir. 2001).
354
See supra notes 216, 317.
355
See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
356
See id.; Mylius, 201 F. at 863; cf. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v.
EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487-94 (2004) (analyzing EPA’s informal interpretation of the
Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration program under Skidmore and
granting deference to the EPA’s interpretation because it was longstanding,
consistently maintained and consistent with the statute’s language and history).
350
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refused to look behind the record of conviction to determine
removability for a criminal conviction,357 yet Silva-Trevino permits
such factual exploration.358 Courts applying Skidmore review have
rejected such agency interpretations that were inconsistent with a
prior interpretation,359 especially when, as in Silva-Trevino, the
decision “stands virtually alone.”360
However, “the fact of an agency’s inconsistency,
standing alone, tells the court little.”361 Courts often permit
agencies to change policies; flexibility is essential for an agency
to effectuate its expertise.362 Yet agency flexibility must be
balanced against the potential for arbitrary decision making.363
Courts have granted Skidmore deference to inconsistent agency
decisions, so long as the decision was thorough.364 One measure
of thoroughness is public participation in the decision-making
process,365 since outside parties may raise issues not previously
357

See, e.g., Dulal-Whiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 124 (2d
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009); In re VelazquezHerrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008); Mylius, 201 F. at 863.
358
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 690 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
359
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991);
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-45 (1976).
360
See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145. As discussed supra note 317, prior to SilvaTrevino, only one court had permitted the agency to engage in an exploration of the
facts to determine removability for a criminal conviction. See Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d
737, 741 (7th Cir. 2008).
361
Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1294.
362
See id. at 1287; see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005).
363
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1294.
364
See Warner-Lambert Co. v. United States, 425 F.3d 1381, 1385-86 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (deferring to a Customs ruling letter, notwithstanding its inconsistency with prior
interpretations, when “Customs wrote a six-page ruling which carefully and convincingly
explained the reasons for the agency’s reclassification decision”); Horn v. Thoratec Corp.,
376 F.3d 163, 179 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)) (reasoning that an agency can change its mind and
receive deference so long as the agency can justify its change with “reasoned analysis”).
365
In a 2009 case, Wyeth v. Levine, the Supreme Court applied the Skidmore
analysis to an FDA statement in a preamble to 2006 regulations that the regulations
preempted state law failure-to-warn claims for prescription drugs. See Wyeth, 129 S.
Ct. 1187, 1200-03 (2009). The Court refused Skidmore deference, reasoning that the
agency’s 2006 rule was finalized without offering states or other interested parties
notice or opportunity for comment, the preamble was at odds with Congress’ purpose,
and it reversed the agency’s own long-standing position without providing a reasoned
explanation. See id. at 1201-02; see also Rubie’s Costume Co. v. United States, 337 F.3d
1350, 1356-58 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (granting Skidmore deference to a Customs ruling letter
that was inconsistent with prior agency position, partially because the agency allowed
notice and comment on the change, which led the court to conclude that Customs gave
thorough consideration to the decision); Heartland By-Products, Inc. v. United States,
264 F.3d 1126, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that a Customs ruling that was
inconsistent with prior rulings was due Skidmore deference partly because the agency
allowed notice and comment on the change).
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contemplated by an agency.366 Because Silva-Trevino presented
an inconsistent agency policy that arose through procedures
lacking any public participation367 and upset the settled
expectations of thousands of noncitizens,368 courts are likely to
give the decision less weight.369
Does the Silva-Trevino decision demonstrate “thoroughness
evident in its consideration?”370 The agency’s thoroughness speaks
to the potential for arbitrary decision making.371 In addition, courts
evaluate thoroughness as a separate Skidmore contextual factor.372
In Silva-Trevino, the Attorney General authored a lengthy
decision, anticipating and addressing opposing arguments.373
However, the Attorney General’s decision, while lengthy, was
not thorough. Because he did not anticipate that the decision’s
likely outcome would be a re-litigation of past crimes, the new
moral turpitude test has several consequences that he did not
address.374
Finally, under Skidmore review, courts must ask
whether the reasoning in Silva-Trevino is valid.375 As stated

366

For example, in Heartland By-Products, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals gave Skidmore deference to a Customs ruling letter that was inconsistent with
a prior ruling letter. See Heartland By-Products, 264 F.3d at 1135-36. While the
agency’s inconsistency counseled against Skidmore deference, the court reasoned that
the first ruling letter was not subject to notice and comment, while the ruling letter at
issue was subject to such procedures. See id. at 1136. The first ruling letter also did not
raise an issue that was critical to the agency’s reclassification; outside parties brought
this issue to the agency’s attention subsequent to the issuance of the first ruling letter.
See id. at 1129-30, 1136.
367
See generally supra Part III.
368
See Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 49-55.
369
Cf. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 76061 (10th Cir. 2005) (refusing Skidmore deference to the Bureau of Land Management’s
informal interpretation of a statute, notwithstanding its validity and thoroughness,
partly because the agency had shifted its position on the issue at least three times since
1976, thus upsetting settled expectations for holders of property rights).
370
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
371
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1282-83 (discussing cases in
which courts deferred to inconsistent but well-explained agency positions).
372
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140; Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1258.
373
See In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688-704 (Att’y Gen. 2008).
374
See supra notes 217-24 and accompanying text. In Wilderness Society v.
U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit
refused Skidmore deference to a U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service permitting decision
because the agency decision “devote[d] only a few sentences” to a key question, whether
the operation was a commercial enterprise and therefore precluded by statute in a
wilderness area. Id. at 1069. The court reasoned that the agency’s analysis was not
thorough and therefore did not “reflect the product of specialized agency expertise.” Id.
375
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
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above, there were several errors of law in the decision376 that
may lead a reviewing court to conclude that the agency’s
decision is not valid.377 However, courts’ application of the
validity factor often resembles the permissibility inquiry at
Chevron step two, which is highly deferential to the agency.378
Nonetheless, Skidmore deference is lighter than Chevron
deference.379 As discussed above, each Skidmore factor counsels
against deference to Silva-Trevino. Thus, the application of
Skidmore’s multi-factor approach to the Silva-Trevino decision
likely will lead courts to refuse deference to the decision.380
If Silva-Trevino fails Skidmore review, there will be a
return to the status quo. Should there be a harder look at the
use of the categorical approach in immigration cases? The
Supreme Court recently held that “the statute [INA] foresees
the use of fundamentally fair procedures . . . . But we do not
agree that fairness requires the evidentiary limitations [of the
categorical approach].”381 Some courts have questioned the
approach as unduly formulaic, as the categorical approach
requires the immigration judge to put on blinders as to what
“really happened.”382 There are many prudential reasons to
376

See supra notes 216, 317. The Third Circuit in Jean-Louis reasoned that
“[t]he Attorney General’s argument [in Silva-Trevino] is premised on a fundamental
misreading of the relevant [statutory] language.” Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582
F.3d 462, 477 (3d Cir. 2009). The court attacked the Attorney General’s holding that
“crime” and “involving moral turpitude” are distinct grammatical units, which led the
Attorney General to conclude that the clause “involving moral turpitude” modifies
“crime,” thus permitting a factual inquiry. See id.; see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct.
2294, 2302 (2009) (permitting a factual inquiry into whether an offense involves a loss to
the victim exceeding $10,000 because of the wording of the relevant aggravated felony
category, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), which defines “aggravated felony” as a “fraud
offense in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000”). The Third Circuit reasoned that
the Attorney General “overlooks a crucial fact: crime involving moral turpitude is a term
of art, predating even the immigration statute itself. . . . As such, its division into a noun
and subordinate clause, as the Attorney General seeks to do, distorts its intended
meaning.” Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 477 (citations omitted). The court concluded that
“[b]ecause the Attorney General’s position is premised on a clearly erroneous
interpretation of ‘crime involving moral turpitude,’ no deference is owed to his view.” Id.
377
See Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 (2010) (Kennedy, J., Stevens,
J., & Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (reasoning that an agency’s decision that relies on a legal
error should not be afforded Skidmore deference).
378
See Hickman & Krueger, supra note 343, at 1273.
379
See id. at 1276, 1277-80 (citing studies concluding that Skidmore deference is
“measurably less deferential than Chevron, regardless of the Skidmore model employed”).
380
See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
381
Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2303 (2009); see also In re Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec.
340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980) (holding that the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment
requires removal proceedings to be fundamentally fair).
382
See, e.g., Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (“The push
in the law toward categorical approaches to classifying crimes as either involving moral
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apply the categorical approach, above all because it spares
immigration judges a retrial of the criminal case.383 However,
the agency may wish to reconsider whether efficiency trumps
all in the criminal removal context. For these reasons, perhaps
the solution of courts refusing Chevron deference to the
Attorney General’s decision is not the only answer.
C.

The Agency Can Start Over, Ensuring More Process

The agency can have a say in the overhaul of the
categorical approach and still command Chevron deference by
reconsidering the issue through the use of procedures that
ensure more public input. One option is for the agency to
commence notice-and-comment rulemaking on the new moral
turpitude test. Another option is for the agency to sua sponte
reconsider Silva-Trevino,384 this time inviting briefing from
interested parties.385
The rulemaking option was the solution that Attorney
General Holder used when vacating In re Compean (Compean
I),386 a January 7, 2009, decision by the outgoing Attorney
General Mukasey. In Compean I, Attorney General Mukasey
had decided that there was no right to effective assistance of
counsel in removal cases; he reversed years of immigration
precedent decisions that allowed noncitizens to reopen their
cases based on ineffective assistance of counsel.387 In Compean
I, however, Attorney General Mukasey invited amicus briefing
before his decision was final, thus guaranteeing input from the
public on the drastic change in law.388 When there was
significant public backlash against the decision, Attorney
turpitude or not is largely based on the policy of not retrying prior criminal convictions
in later deportation hearings . . . . No such interest is served by precluding
consideration of basic facts stated on the official court records of the charging and
conviction documents. The categorical approach does not require that blinders be
worn.”); see also United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (reasoning, in
the sentencing context, that the “Taylor analysis is categorical, but an inquiring court
has the right to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence . . . . The court is not
required either to wear blinders or to leave common sense out of the equation.”).
383
See, e.g., NAIJ Statement, supra note 212.
384
See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2003).
385
See AILF Letter, supra note 219, at 4 (requesting that Attorney General
Holder withdraw Silva-Trevino and set a briefing schedule to allow interested parties
to submit briefs on the implications of a change in the categorical approach);
Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 7.
386
See 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Att’y Gen. 2009).
387
Id. at 712-13.
388
See id. at 713-14.
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General Holder vacated the opinion in June 2009.389 In
Compean II, Attorney General Holder stated: “I do not believe
that the process used in Compean resulted in a thorough
consideration of the issues involved, particularly for a decision
that implemented a new, complex framework in place of a wellestablished and longstanding practice . . . .”390 Attorney General
Holder decided to commence notice-and-comment rulemaking
on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in removal
proceedings.391 Attorney General Holder can respond to the
Silva-Trevino case with a similar tactic, by vacating the
opinion and proposing regulations.
However, there are several reasons why Attorney
General Holder may choose not to address Silva-Trevino in the
same way as Compean I. For one, the right to effective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings is a more
politically-safe battle to fight. Noncitizens who have fallen prey
to bad attorneys are perceived as victims; noncitizens who have
been convicted of crimes rarely are viewed as victims.392 The
right to effective assistance of counsel is a more
straightforward issue than the categorical approach; thus the
public may not understand the impact of Silva-Trevino.393
Attorney General Holder also may not want the publicity of
overruling Silva-Trevino, which can be viewed as a triumph of
common sense (deport the child molester when a judge knows
those were the facts) over creative lawyering (because the
record of conviction does not show those facts, the child
molester avoids deportation). Finally, as notice-and-comment
rulemaking is costly to the agency,394 Attorney General Holder
may not wish to spend the agency’s time on the new moral
turpitude test, especially because the agency is currently in the
process of writing regulations on the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.

389

In re Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (Compean II).
Id. at 2.
391
Id.
392
See generally, Criminal Alien Program, ICE.GOV, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
news/library/factsheets/pdf/cap.pdf (last visited February 21, 2011) (describing ICE’s
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), which is “responsible for identifying, processing and
removing criminal aliens incarcerated in federal, state and local prisons and jails
throughout the United States, preventing their release into the general public by securing
a final order of removal prior to the termination of their sentences, when possible”).
393
Cf. Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) (reasoning that “the
categorical method is not always easy to apply”).
394
See Magill, supra note 103, at 1397; Stephenson, supra note 105, at 546.
390
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Should the agency commence notice-and-comment
rulemaking on the categorical approach, there is no guarantee
that the end product will be any different than the Attorney
General’s decision in Silva-Trevino. Scholars are skeptical of
the notice-and-comment rulemaking process for its fanfare at
the expense of real deliberation.395 Professor Donald Elliott has
stated,
No administrator in Washington turns to full-scale notice-andcomment rulemaking when she is genuinely interested in obtaining
input from interested parties. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to
public participation as Japanese Kabuki theater is to human
passions—a highly stylized process for displaying in a formal way
the essence of something which in real life takes place in other
venues.396

A cheaper, more efficient option is for Attorney General
Holder to reconsider Silva-Trevino, inviting interested parties
to brief issues. This technique has been used by the BIA and
Attorneys General in the past when the agency was
considering a major change in policy through adjudication.397 As
with rulemaking, immigration advocates and judges would
have an opportunity for input and thus could detail the benefits
of using the categorical approach in removal proceedings.398
395

See Barron & Kagan, supra note 135, at 231-32; see also id. at 232
(“[N]otice-and-comment rulemaking today tends to promote a conception of the
regulatory process as a forum for competition among interest groups, rather than a
means to further the public interest.”).
396
Elliott, supra note 150, at 1492-93. Often, the venues in which the
discussion takes place are informal conversations between agency staff and interested
parties outside the agency, which allow for crucial input by the public before the
agency publishes the notice of proposed rulemaking. Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld,
Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of
Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1956-60 (2008) (discussing transparency in agency
rulemaking, which occurs during the rule development, and stating, “[b]y the time an
agency issues a [notice of proposed rulemaking], it has already invested much time and
effort in developing the proposed rule and often does not change it in fundamental
ways in response to comments”).
397
See, e.g., Compean I, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 713-14 (Att’y Gen. 2009) (noting
the Attorney General’s invitation to interested groups to brief changes on ineffective
assistance of counsel policy); Reconsideration Memo, supra note 66, at 8-9 (citing In re
Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996)) (discussing Attorney General Reno’s
invitation for briefing from interested parties on the retroactivity of changes to relief
under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) and noting that the decision addresses the points
raised in the amicus briefs); see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 762-63
(1969) (plurality opinion) (quoting Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1238)
(discussing how the NLRB had “invited certain interested parties” to file briefs and
participate in oral arguments prior to its ruling in Excelsior Underwear, which set forth
a new policy requiring employers to provide unions with lists of names of employees
before elections).
398
See, e.g., ABA RESOLUTION, supra note 228; NAIJ Statement, supra note 212.
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However, there is no guarantee that the agency will take the
side of immigrants’ rights advocates (and immigration judges)
and maintain the categorical approach. Nonetheless, ensuring
more process—either through rulemaking or adjudication with
invitation for briefing—allows the agency to think about this
major overhaul to the law before imposing it on affected
parties.399 If the agency cannot give a reasoned response to a
concern raised by commentators, a court can later reject the
agency’s interpretation as arbitrary and capricious.400
Attorney General Holder may avoid any reconsideration
of Silva-Trevino, perceiving that courts will not defer to the
decision, as courts may interpret the word “conviction” to
clearly indicate a Congressional preference for the categorical
approach.401 Or, the Attorney General may simply wait to see
what courts will do with the decision.402 However, “one year and
half after the issuance of Silva-Trevino—and thousands of
petitions for review later—no circuit court has endorsed its

399

See Anthony, Interpretive Rules, supra note 180, at 1373; Bressman,
Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at 1781.
400
See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20
(1971). Scholars argue that the best way for an agency to anticipate potential problems
with its decision is to open up the process to challengers before the decision is final;
formal procedures facilitate this crucial input from the public. See Bressman,
Procedures as Politics, supra note 162, at 1781.
401
See, e.g., Dulal-Whiteway v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116, 125 (2d
Cir. 2007), abrogated by Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009); In re VelazquezHerrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 513 (B.I.A. 2008); but see supra note 341 (discussing
ambiguity of the INA).
402
Only one circuit court, the Third Circuit, has reviewed the Attorney
General’s decision in Silva-Trevino and explicitly rejected the new test for determining
whether an offense involves moral turpitude. See Jean-Louis v. Attorney General, 582
F.3d 462, 478-80 (3d Cir. 2009). The Eighth Circuit recently held, without significant
discussion, that it refused to apply Silva-Trevino because it conflicted with the court’s
precedent. See Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010). The
Seventh Circuit, without discussion, held that it would defer to Silva-Trevino and
remanded for the agency to apply the Silva-Trevino test in the first instance. See MataGuerrero v. Holder, 627 F.3d 256, 261 (7th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit declined to
consider a challenge to the retroactive application of the Silva-Trevino framework; the
court remanded the case because the petitioner’s hearing did not comport with due
process. See Castruita-Gomez, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 18612 at *3-4. The Ninth Circuit
declined to consider another challenge to the Silva-Trevino framework; the court
granted the government’s motion to remand the case to the BIA “in order to more fully
articulate its analysis in a manner consistent with the multi-step approach set forth in
Matter of Silva-Trevino.” Order, Zamudio-Ramirez v. Holder, No. 09-71083 (Apr. 13,
2010). In both Ninth Circuit cases, immigrants’ rights organizations filed amicus briefs
highlighting the various problems with the Attorney General’s decision. See CastruitaGomez Amicus Brief, supra note 78; Zamudio-Ramirez Amicus Brief, supra note 78.
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radical framework.”403 Courts may be signaling that the
agency’s failure to employ procedures that ensure public input
means courts have little faith in the Silva-Trevino decision.404
V.

CONCLUSION

In his last-minute decision in Silva-Trevino, Attorney
General Mukasey created a drastic change in immigration law
by overhauling the categorical approach, which had been used
by immigration judges for over a century to determine whether
a noncitizen had been convicted of a CIMT. The Attorney
General made such a change through a process that allowed no
input from parties affected by the change, including the
individual whose case became the new precedent. Courts
examining this last minute overhaul should find that these
procedures guaranteed neither transparency nor careful
consideration, which are essential elements of law making. For
this reason, courts should refuse deference at Chevron step
zero, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mead. This
would likely lead to a court overturning the policy under the
Skidmore standard.
A different route to curing the procedural defects is for
the agency to correct the problem itself. This would entail
Attorney General Holder reconsidering the decision through
either the notice-and-comment rulemaking process or allowing
interested parties to brief the issues; either choice by the
agency would allow public input on this significant change in
immigration law.
As Attorney General Holder stated during his
confirmation hearings, “I firmly believe that transparency is a
403

Castruita-Gomez Amicus Brief, supra note 78, at 15-17 (discussing cases in
which circuit courts have applied the traditional categorical approach notwithstanding
the Silva-Trevino decision); but see Mata-Guerrero, 627 F.3d at 261 (holding, without
discussion, that it would give Chevron deference to Silva-Trevino and remanding for the
agency to apply the Silva-Trevino test in the first instance). The BIA recently concluded
that because no circuit court had repudiated the procedural framework in Silva-Trevino,
it was obliged to follow all three steps of the new moral turpitude test; the BIA remanded
the case to the immigration judge to examine evidence outside of the record of conviction
to determine whether the offense involved moral turpitude. See In re Guevara Alfaro, 25
I. & N. Dec. 417, 421-24 (B.I.A. 2011); see also In re Ahortalejo-Guzman, 25 I. & N. Dec.
465 (B.I.A. 2011) (affirming Silva-Trevino and holding that it was inappropriate for an
immigration judge to consult documents outside of the record of conviction to determine
the nature of the offense when the statute of conviction was not divisible).
404
See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 470-71 n.11 (“[T]he lack of transparency,
coupled with the absence of input by interested stakeholders, only serves to dissuade
us further from deferring to the Attorney General’s novel approach.”).
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key to good government. Openness allows the public to have
faith that its government obeys the laws. Public scrutiny also
provides an important check against unpersuasive legal
reasoning—reasoning that is biased toward a particular
conclusion.”405 The Attorney General should keep his promise,
ensuring transparency and careful consideration in agency
action—elements noticeably missing from his predecessor’s
decision in Silva-Trevino.

405

AILF Letter, supra note 219, at 3 (quoting Confirmation Hearings for
Attorney General Eric H. Holder, available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/nominations/
111thCongressExecutiveNominations/upload/FeingoldToHolder.pdf (Question and Answer
2) (responding to question from Senator Feingold that addressed problems of “secret law”
under the Bush administration)).

